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Abstract 
The growing demand for residential energy has led to the implementation of numerous 
programs aimed at increasing energy efficiency in existing homes.  These programs are designed 
to lower the demand strain placed on utility systems, save households money on their monthly 
bills, and reduce related emissions.  This paper examines the factors that influence household 
participation in efficiency programs including economic incentives, information effects, social 
pressures and household characteristics.  The analysis uses data from the City of Urbana-Ameren 
Illinois partnership program which provided free energy audits and subsidies for insulation 
retrofits between 2010 and 2012.  A survey administered to Urbana residents focusing on their 
program knowledge and neighborhood cohesion is used to test the effects of social capital on 
retrofit participation, while Census and tax assessors data are utilized to understand the 
importance of certain household characteristics on participation.  Results suggest that in addition 
to characteristics directly related to energy savings potential, such as the year of construction, 
high neighborhood social capital is shown to be a defining characteristic of neighborhoods with 
program participants.   
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Part I. Introduction 
Household energy demand makes up approximately 18% of the total US demand for 
energy (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008), and each year households emit 345 million metric 
tons of carbon dioxide from household heating fuel sources (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2008).  The combination of rising energy costs and a suffering economy has 
elevated household interest in saving money by cutting back on energy usage.  Also, household 
energy use generates the negative externalities of degraded environmental and human health 
quality, creating additional benefits of demand reduction.  Utility companies have incentive to 
promote household energy conservation as well.  Recent legislation in many states has set new 
requirements for yearly demand reduction to reach emissions targets.  Additionally, if demand 
exceeds current capacity, infrastructure expansion would be very costly; and because of market 
regulation, raising prices to cover the cost is not always an option. 
One method of reducing overall consumption is addressing the efficiency of existing 
homes.  Existing homes are large contributors to overall energy demand and present a significant 
opportunity for improved efficiency.  Many of these structures, particularly those built before the 
1970’s, have little to no insulation.  Improving the insulation in these homes can save the 
homeowner money while simultaneously reducing the negative externalities associated with 
home heating fuel use.  Although many households stand to save money over time by completing 
certain upgrades, only a small portion of homeowners are implementing these projects for a 
variety of reasons, including high upfront costs and the inconvenience of large scale home 
improvement projects. 
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Numerous local programs, and federal and state tax credits, have been created to 
encourage efficiency upgrades.  Municipalities, with the support of a growing number of federal 
grants; and utilities, striving to meet demand reduction targets, have created programs with the 
same goal.  As a result, insulation retrofits have seen increasing popularity in recent years, and 
consequently, home heating fuel consumption rose only 1.5% between 1990 and 2008 despite 
large increases in average home size (US EIA, 2008).  The City of Urbana, Illinois, in 
partnership with the local utility provider Ameren Illinois, enacted one such efficiency program 
in 2010.  Through this program, eligible households could receive a free home energy audit and 
subsidies for insulation retrofit projects resulting in more efficient homes.   
Discovering what drives retrofit behavior can help policymakers better formulate and 
target programs to reduce energy demand and associated emissions.  While providing free audit 
services and rebates does provide financial incentive for conservation behavior, there may be 
other dimensions of incentives and influences that affect behavior.  This research examines 
participation in the Urbana-Ameren program through spatial, econometric and social analyses in 
order to gain a more complete understanding of motivating factors.  First, spatial patterns in audit 
and retrofit participation are explored through kernel density estimation, cluster detection, and a 
visual exploration of diffusion of participant location over time.  Using these methods, areas of 
unusually high or low participation relative to the eligible background population can be 
discovered and furthered analyzed.  The second analysis uses econometric models to predict the 
effects of various factors believed to influence the household decision to participate in a free 
home energy audit and invest in subsidized efficiency retrofit projects.  Demographic and 
housing stock information are used to predict audit participation, while imputed audit report 
figures, including estimated lifetime gas savings and available rebates, are included in the model 
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of retrofit participation.  Audit and retrofit participation are modeled using zero-inflated Poisson 
and ordered Probit models respectively.  The final analysis uses survey data to test the hypothesis 
that neighborhoods that have higher social capital indicators, and therefore are more likely to 
share program information and experiences, will be more likely to have retrofit participants.   
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Part II. Literature Review 
Research in energy efficiency behavior is motivated by the seemingly lower than optimal 
upgrade rate.  With such a large number of households not upgrading despite the potential for 
energy cost savings, researchers attempt to identify what is inhibiting action.  Understanding 
these barriers informs what role policy can play in encouraging those who would not otherwise 
upgrade to participate.  By developing an understanding of the current motivators of behavioral 
change, future policies can harness that influence to promote energy efficiency.   
While many households will choose to upgrade their insulation and make other 
improvements to their homes in order to increase efficiency, many more will not.  Hirst and 
Brown (1990) estimate that less than half of all possible efficiency improvements will be made 
because of what is referred to as the efficiency gap, defined as the variety of factors, both 
structural and behavioral, that keep the realized efficiency rates from reaching the optimum 
rates.   They argue that there are structural barriers to changes such as the uncertainty of project 
effectiveness and future fuel costs, lack of access to capital to finance large improvement 
projects, and inefficient policies.  While many of these issues can be addressed through policy 
measures, Hirst and Brown also point to behavioral barriers that create obstacles perhaps more 
difficult to overcome.  These barriers include attitudes towards environmental conservation and 
information gaps.  Households can make more informed decisions to take action when they 
know about the potential savings available to them.  
In their 1994 article, Jaffe and Stavins categorize the barriers into market and nonmarket 
failures.  One such market failure is information as a public good.  Households have incentives to 
delay adopting new technologies or making large behavioral changes because doing so provides 
information for others to use to make a decision about their own behavior.  There is incentive to 
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delay action and free ride on the experience of others, as oppose to taking the risk to be an early 
adopter.  The non-market failures they discuss include the high discount rate placed on future 
savings because of the uncertainty of the effectiveness of the project, combined with potentially 
long predicted payback periods, the stigma of undesirable qualities associated with efficient 
products, and the costs, both financial and otherwise, of adopting a new behavior.  People are 
susceptible to the force of inertia, and to get large scale changes requires benefits that exceed the 
costs at a margin that covers the inconvenience of a disrupted routine.  In their empirical study, 
Banfi et al. (2008) use a choice experiment to elicit willingness to pay for wall insulation and 
find that the stated values were above true project costs, yet the improvements were not made.  
The authors suggest this could be due to legal, structural and socioeconomic barriers.   They 
explain it could be a lack of information on the advantages, or a lack of methods to monetize the 
advantages, which then excludes these advantages from factoring in to the decision making 
process.  Programs such as Urbana-Ameren Act on Energy attempt to close this gap by providing 
the incentive and information needed to move households into action. 
Participation in energy efficiency improvement programs has been examined in many 
earlier studies, however the range of influences examined has typically been more narrowly 
defined than is the case in this research.  While the studies previously discussed focus on why 
individuals do not act to improve efficiency, another strain of the literature has focused on why 
people do take action.  Much of the previous literature has focused on the decision to invest in 
retrofits, while little attention has been given to the decision to complete household energy 
audits.  Although an audit alone does not necessarily reduce energy demand, encouraging 
participation in this stage is important, as it provides information that can increase the likelihood 
of undertaking energy saving projects. Cameron (1985) examines household energy efficient 
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retrofit behavior; however, her analysis is focused primarily on the economic incentives offered 
by the program.  While her findings do suggest economic incentives are important, other studies 
suggest that additional motivating factors such as household characteristics (Millock & Nauges, 
2010), information provision (Anderson & Newell, 2004),  and social pressures  (Baerenklau, 
2005) also play roles in influencing efficiency retrofit decisions.  Previous research has evaluated 
programs based on one or two of the aforementioned factors.  In this paper, the Urbana-Ameren 
program will be evaluated based on all of these factors to generate a more complete explanation 
of the participation decision.   
2.1 Economic Incentives 
The most direct effect of a retrofit subsidy program is the economic incentive, and in 
most studies, it has shown to be somewhat successful in encouraging retrofits.  Firms and 
governments allocate funds to these programs with the expectation that households will respond 
positively to receiving partial reimbursement for their projects.  Using household level survey 
data, Cameron (1985) finds that at a base level subsidy rate of 15%, a one percent increase in the 
amount of subsidy offered would persuade an additional 0.2% of households to retrofit.  In 
addition to the response to changes in subsidy amounts, Cameron also finds important 
information about the elasticity of demand for efficiency retrofits.  The cross price elasticity with 
fuel price is only slightly elastic, with a 1% increase in relative fuel prices leading to a 0.4% 
increase in retrofit activity.  In relation to its own price, wall insulation projects are found to be 
approximately unit elastic. This evidence supports subsidies as a useful policy tool, regardless of 
predicted fuel costs.  
In addition to the present value of the costs and benefits of proposed projects, predicted 
payback periods are also important to consider.  Anderson and Newell (2004) focus on this 
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aspect of economic incentives in the context of retrofit behaviors following free energy audits at 
manufacturing plants.  Because of capital constraints
1
 and the discount applied to future savings, 
the timing of the savings might matter as much as the amount of the savings.  Understanding the 
importance of the payment schedule can help program administrators offer payments at the 
points in the process that will make the largest impact.  For example, Anderson and Newell find 
that firms are 40% more responsive to changes in initial costs of projects than to annual savings, 
and that some projects will not be adopted regardless of annual savings when the initial 
investment is too high.  While firms are more constrained than individual households by 
quarterly gains and losses, households also must operate under a budget.  High upfront costs may 
not present an equal barrier across all income levels due to the limited access to credit available 
to low income households.  Anderson and Newell provide the additional explanation that it could 
be uncertainty of future savings that makes annual savings less influential.  This somewhat 
contradicts Cameron’s (1985) findings that insulation demand is inelastic with regards to fuel 
prices, however the inclusion of uncertainty complicates the reaction more than simply a change 
in price.  Not surprisingly, they also find that projects with shorter paybacks were preferred by 
audited firms over projects with longer payback periods, because of time preference.  Of the 
firms in their study that elected to invest in efficiency retrofits, the average payback period was 
1.4 years.    
2.2 Household Characteristics 
While energy efficiency programs can offer incentives that are informed by the literature, 
the degree of success of a program will depend on the characteristics of the targeted population.   
Household specific characteristics are important factors in the decision to participate in both the 
                                                     
1
 Berry (1984) finds that very few homes make use of available low interest financing options, which could suggest 
that only some homes face capital constraints, but could also be the result of a lack of adequate financing options. 
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audit and subsidized retrofit programs.    Previous studies have found a large deviation in 
behavior based on household occupant ownership status, which is particularly important in the 
case of Urbana because of the unusually high percentage of rental properties (65% renter 
occupied versus a 35% national average (US Census Bureau, 2010)).  Banfi et al. (2009) find 
that renters were willing to pay 6% of their monthly rent on wall insulation projects while single 
family homeowners were willing to pay 7% of the purchase price of their home.  Millock and 
Nauges (2010), in a similar study involving water efficiency retrofits, explain homeowners are 
more likely to participate in water conservation activities because they are more likely to pay the 
bills and realize the long term benefits, a finding that most likely applies to the case of energy 
efficiency.  Even if renters are willing to pay for the project, they may not have the ability to 
contract the project, and therefore must rely on landlords to take action.  Landlords are less likely 
to want to invest, which Phillips (2012) related to information asymmetries between tenants and 
landlords.  His study, which used a choice experiment to elicit willingness to pay values from 
both groups for various energy efficiency upgrades, finds that landlords were willing to pay 50-
70% of what tenants were willing to pay for certain upgrades. Tenants were even willing to pay 
higher monthly rents to have such projects done to their homes because of the increased comfort 
it would provide, however, Phillips explains that a lack of market signals keeps landlords from 
taking action. 
Another important factor in the decision to invest in insulation upgrades is the condition 
of the physical housing unit.  Owners of newer houses may not participate, not because they do 
not value energy savings, but rather because their home is already properly insulated.  This 
finding is also relevant in the case of Urbana because there were many homes built in the mid 
2000’s (City of Urbana Tax Assessor, 2012) that most likely contain adequate insulation.  
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Cameron also found that households respond with retrofits to fuel price shocks, but as more and 
more homeowners complete projects, there are diminishing responses to price shocks (1985).   
 Socioeconomic characteristics of household residents may also influence the decision to 
retrofit or schedule an audit, although the direction and magnitude of this influence may be 
difficult to predict.  For example, the effect of high income on conservation behavior could be 
positive since those households can afford the investment costs of the projects.  There is also 
diminishing marginal utility of income, so they may not value the savings as much (Millock & 
Nauges, 2010). Higher income households may also be willing to pay for insulation at a higher 
cost to where they would invest in the retrofits even in the absence of the subsidy, while low 
income households may require the extra incentive payment in order to take action.  Cameron’s 
model (1985) estimates that for a 10% decrease in income, 0.5% more households would retrofit 
even with no subsidies available, suggesting that lower income households are more likely to 
seek out these savings. Both hosting an auditor and scheduling a contractor to install the 
upgrades introduce an opportunity cost not observed in the market price. Wealthy households 
might have higher opportunity costs (Millock & Nauges, 2010) of spending their time scheduling 
and hosting an auditor because of higher lost wages.  Alternatively, the opportunity cost could 
also be more of a function of flexibility in work hours than wage rates.  In this case, households 
with at least one adult at home would be more likely to participate.  For example, households of 
retirees on fixed incomes would face low opportunity costs of scheduling and hosting audit 
appointments. 
Socioeconomic characteristics could also be predictors of attitudes towards 
environmental concern.  Klineberg, McKeever & Rothenbach (1998) perform a meta-analysis of 
studies on this topic and find that income only plays a role in environmental concern when the 
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proxy for environmental concern involves higher costs in exchange for more environmentally 
friendly processes, for example premium priced organic products.  This effect may not be clear 
in the case of efficiency projects because the costs of insulation are somewhat offset by the 
savings from increased efficiency.  Klineberg et al. also find that education has a significantly 
positive effect on environmental concern.  Urbana, IL is a university town with above average 
educational attainment rates so it is important to consider that participation could be at least 
partially driven by environmental concerns.  The effects of socioeconomic characteristics are not 
clear in all cases.  Ferguson (1993) finds that retrofit behaviors have less to do with 
socioeconomic characteristics than with actual house age and location.  It is still important to 
consider these household traits in the context of the Urbana program because these factors may 
have large effects when considered at a more localized scale. 
2.3 Information Effects 
In addition to providing economic incentives, energy conservation programs can also be 
designed to spread information and awareness to households, which alone could be enough to 
inspire conservation activity.  It is important to understand how many households were 
motivated to upgrade based solely on the information they received in order to gauge the 
necessity of the incentive payments.  As Cameron (1985) explains, social benefits only arise 
from “induced” retrofit projects.  If a household would complete a project without a subsidy but 
still receives payment, the funding is not optimally allocated.  In relation to the Urbana-Ameren 
project, it could be the case that providing information about potential energy savings through 
the audit, and building awareness of the benefits of upgrading insulation, would induce the same 
number of retrofit projects as was realized with subsidies offered.  Furthermore, investment in 
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retrofits could be dependent on having enough information, thus making participation in the 
audit phase a likely precondition for households to engage in the subsidized retrofits program.   
A major benefit of information provision is reduced risk (Anderson & Newell, 2004).  
With uncertain outcomes, as is the case with future energy savings from retrofits, more 
information about the estimated outcomes can reduce the uncertainty and make a decision to act 
more favorable.  While households might know that improving the insulation in their homes 
would reduce their energy demand, they might not know the magnitude of potential savings with 
much certainty.  The information provided in the audit reduces this uncertainty by providing an 
assessment from a professional adviser as to the most cost effective projects to undertake and 
estimated energy and cost savings from those projects.  Also, because insulation retrofits are for 
most practical considerations irreversible and discrete, households are not able to install and 
uninstall smoothly as fuel prices rise and fall.  Cameron (1985) describes this as a “ratchet” 
effect, and in this case, information that reduces uncertainty is especially important to the 
investment decision. 
Information provision can also simply bring attention to facts that might be known but 
not considered in daily decision making.  Energy use monitoring systems are also based on this 
theory.  Ueno, et al. (2006) find that a real time energy use data system placed in homes prompts 
a 16% reduction in energy used for heating.  The audit report provided to homes, although not 
real time data, can provide information to households on potential cost saving and externality 
reductions that could incite retrofit activity.  The audit could also trigger smaller conservation 
behavioral changes such as lowering the set temperature or using a programmable thermostat in 
addition to the reduction in demand from the efficient light bulbs provided by the energy adviser.  
In general, a large scale effort like the Urbana-Ameren Act on Energy program increases 
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awareness of energy use and starts discussions that can lead to decreases in energy demand 
beyond the direct effect of subsidized insulation upgrades. 
2.4 Social Pressure 
Another important way spatial and social relationships influence program participation is 
through social pressures.  Neighborhood social influence and information sharing are generally 
not covered in the energy efficiency literature but do receive attention in the public health and 
community development literature.  Individuals become much more likely to adopt new 
behaviors and technologies when they observe their peers doing the same (Baerenklau, 2005).  In 
a study of water efficiency upgrades, Millock and Nauges (2010) found that respondents who 
perceived a social norm of water conservation were much more likely to reduce their own water 
use than those who did not perceive that social norm.   Ioannides (2005) links these social 
pressures to spatial proximity in what he describes as the “neighborhood effect”.  His study 
examines how a household’s maintenance decisions are not only a function of its own 
characteristics, but also of its neighbors’ decisions.  
A considerable amount of the risk of retrofitting can be mitigated by learning through 
others, or social learning.  A household decision maker can factor in the experiences of those he 
or she knows to better understand the risk of return on investment faced through participation.  
The reduction of risk helps the homeowner adequately consider the potential costs and benefits.  
However, as Jaffe and Stavins (2004) suggested in their discussion of the energy efficiency gap, 
this effect does not always lead to higher levels of participation.  Instead of assuming the risk of 
adopting a new technology, people have incentive to wait for other members of their networks to 
adopt and then learn from their experience (Monge, Hartwich, & Halgin, 2008).  This also means 
that one participant influences the decision of other households with which it shares information.  
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Therefore, it may be beneficial to offer additional incentives to early adopters, mitigating the 
market failure of their free information provision and encouraging them to share their experience 
with other decision makers 
One way to measure the influence of peers on a households’ decision making is to look at 
the social capital of the networks to which the household belongs, where a network is the set of 
people with whom the individual interacts.  Social capital can take many definitions, but should 
be considered here as “the effect of characteristics of friends, acquaintances, or groups on 
individual outcomes” (Mouw, 2006, p.79).  It is a measure of interconnectedness within a 
network that gives households access to resources beyond what they might have on their own, 
whether that be information or physical capital resources.  While evaluating the Urbana-Ameren 
program, the focus is on social capital within neighborhood social networks, or how the 
characteristics and beliefs of neighbors affect a household’s decision to participate in the 
program.  The interaction of peer attitudes and the strength of social capital in a network could 
be expected to have an important influence on participation. 
It can be difficult to discern the effects of social capital on household decisions because 
people tend to associate themselves, either through relationships or housing location, with others 
who share their attitudes and beliefs through what is called social homophily (Mouw, 2006). 
Therefore, there is a danger that any effects attributed to social capital are actually just 
representing something more in the underlying reasons people group with whom they do (Mouw, 
2006).  When analyzing the effects of social capital on participation decisions, it is important to 
account for this possibility.    
In the case of the Urbana-Ameren program, it might be expected that participation is 
partially driven by peer pressures, and therefore, areas where neighbors have more frequent 
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interactions and have relationships where household decisions are discussed might have higher 
levels of participation.  This would particularly be expected if a member of the neighborhood 
was an early adopter who shares his or her experiences with others.  This potential effect is 
examined more closely in both the spatial and social capital analyses sections. 
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Part III. Urbana-Ameren Energy Efficiency Program 
The City of Urbana and the local utility provider, Ameren Illinois, ran a program between 
August 2010 and December 2012 to encourage improvements in energy efficiency for homes in 
the city. Ameren offered rebates and services to all of their customers in the state and the city of 
Urbana supplemented the program by offering further rebates to its residents.  In 2007, the State 
of Illinois passed a law requiring electricity and natural gas providers to reduce their demand to 
meet incremental standards of on average an additional 1.5% reduction in demand each year 
through 2019.  To meet these goals, the law also stipulated that utilities were allowed to charge 
an additional rate equal to the program cost (Illinois Energy Efficiency Programs, 2009).   As per 
the requirements, Ameren Illinois created the Act on Energy program, consisting of various 
rebate programs ranging from appliance upgrade rebates to new home construction guidelines.  
One aspect of the program offered home energy audits for $25 to Ameren customers.  An 
Ameren home energy audit consists of an energy advisor going to the home and examining the 
housing structure’s existing insulation.  Based on the findings, the advisor gives the household a 
report detailing suggested retrofit measures along with estimated costs, subsidy payments 
available and energy savings.  The report detailed available rebates for insulation projects 
installed by program approved contractors including $0.50 per square foot of attic insulation (up 
to $1,400), $1.00 per square foot of wall insulation (up to $2,400), and $0.50 per CFM  (up to 
$1,200) of air leakage reduction from air sealing projects  (Ameren Illinois, 2012).  The auditor 
also provided efficient light bulbs and water fixtures at no charge.   
The City of Urbana, with funding through the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block 
Grant from the U.S. Department of Energy, offered residents further discounts to supplement 
those offered by Ameren.  Urbana allocated $72,000 of federal funding to this program with the 
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goal of improving the efficiency of 800 households (Urbana Home Energy Performance Program 
FAQs, 2011).  The city augmented the Ameren program by first covering the energy audit fee so 
all Urbana homeowners could receive an audit at no cost.  The city also offered an additional 
rebate worth 20% of the Ameren subsidy received for insulation upgrades.  The homeowner was 
responsible for paying for the projects and would receive the rebate soon after filing the 
appropriate paperwork. 
Eligibility restrictions did apply for the subsidies, including that the household be owner 
occupied and, specifically for wall insulation, that there be no existing insulation in the areas 
being retrofitted.  Having an audit, however, was not a requirement for receiving the subsidy.  
The requirement of no existing insulation removes most houses built in recent years from 
eligibility.  Also, since Urbana is a university town, and has an unusually high percentage of 
renters, the home ownership requirement eliminated a large portion of structures from being 
eligible.   
This program addressed many of the barriers discussed in the energy efficiency gap 
literature.  The free home audit alleviates some of the uncertainty of upgrade effectiveness and 
closes the information gap. While there is still some risk of a poor performing product, the 
savings estimates provided in the report would greatly reduce uncertainty of adoption.  Because 
of the audit, home owners had the information necessary to make the participation decision in the 
retrofit stage.  In theory, the subsidy payments should have reduced the amount of capital needed 
for the initial investment.  However, since the payments were reimbursed and not provided 
upfront, the households still needed to be able to incur the cost until the rebate was processed.  
This delay could be more of a barrier for lower income households. 
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Of the almost 17,000 households in Urbana about 840 participated in the program in 
some capacity.  When considering the high rental rate (65%) over 10% of eligible homes 
participated in some manner.  While the city did reach its goal of working with 800 households, 
many of these households received an audit, but did not retrofit, leaving opportunity for 
improvement in demand reduction in future programs. 
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Part IV. Data 
 The outcomes of interest in this study are participation rates in both the audit and retrofit 
phases of the Urbana-Ameren program.  The City of Urbana Office of Sustainability provided 
data on program participation through two datasets.  The data was available at the household 
level, however to protect the privacy of the participants, no unique identifiers were provided and 
the addresses were rounded to the nearest hundred (for example, 123 Main St appeared as 100 
Main St.).  The audit participation data contained the rounded addresses of all households that 
received a free home energy audit through the program, as well as the date the audit occurred and 
the name of the energy advisor.  826 households received an audit between August of 2010 and 
February of 2012.  All of the audits were performed by the same energy advisor and the 
households were located across the city, as can be seen in the map of audit participation in Figure 
1.   
More detailed information on retrofit subsidy recipients was provided for the analysis as 
well.  Also identified by a rounded address, each record contained information on completed 
projects, broken down by insulation type (air sealing, wall or attic insulation), and estimates of 
future savings.  The total cost of all insulation upgrades, as well as the contracted installation 
company and audit advisor (if an audit was also done), was provided as well.  A more detailed 
explanation of this data is described below as it relates to the evaluation of economic incentives.  
Finally, the dataset had the date of the retrofit payment and the type of heating equipment used in 
the home
2
.  In total, 152 households received a subsidy for an insulation upgrade project.  
Retrofitted households are also dispersed across the city (Figure 2).  15 retrofit observations were 
dropped because they did not have an address associated with the record, and one audit 
                                                     
2
 All but one of the households is heated by natural gas.  
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observation was dropped due to an invalid address.  A summary of retrofit project uptake (Table 
1) shows air sealing was the most popular project, with almost all retrofitted households adding 
insulation there, while wall insulation was the least popular.  This is interesting to note because 
wall insulation had the highest energy savings per unit installed of any of the projects. 
 The various analyses in this study explore the motivating factors of participation in the 
Urbana-Ameren energy efficiency program, including the economic incentives, information 
effects, social characteristics, and background household characteristics.  To examine these 
diverse influences, data from a range of sources that could be manipulated into comparable units 
of observation were needed.  In addition to the participation data, the City of Urbana also 
provided property assessment data which includes details of the housing stock expected to be 
important in the decision to retrofit.  This information is complemented by 2010 US Census data 
and primary data collected through a survey of Urbana residents.  This data can be used to test 
the effects of each of the broader influences explored in the literature review. 
4.1 Economic Incentives  
Based on the literature, several characteristics of the subsidy payments are expected to 
have an influence on the likelihood of a household to participate in the retrofit stage of the 
program.  The subsidy covering the audit is also likely to produce increased participation in that 
stage; however since there was no heterogeneity in the incentive offered to homeowners in 
Urbana, this is not tested.  The retrofit participant dataset provided by the Urbana Office of 
Sustainability included details about the projects undertaken and the particular rebates received 
by each household.  For each insulation type, the square footage installed, the incentive received 
and the estimated lifetime gas savings were provided (see Table 2 for a summary of this data).  
The incentives were calculated based on the rules of the Urbana-Ameren program as described in 
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the previous section, and separate values were presented for the contributions from Ameren and 
the City.  The gas savings were estimated as the square footage installed (or CFM air flow 
reduction for air sealing projects) multiplied by the therms
3
 per square foot per year saved, 
multiplied by the expected useful life
4
 of the insulation. The dataset also included the total 
project cost which is likely to be an important factor in the likelihood of participation.  The 
project costs ranged greatly (with a standard deviation of almost $10,000).  The average 
retrofitting household received a subsidy covering about one third of the total project cost, which 
is a significant incentive.  Unfortunately, no data is available on the estimated savings and 
incentives for projects recommended during the audit stage that were not completed.  In the 
analysis of retrofit participation, estimates of these values are imputed using a Heckman Sample 
Selection model. 
4.2 Information and Social Pressure Effects 
The data utilized to examine the effects of information provision and social pressure are 
discussed together because they come primarily from the same sources.  Mainly, these analyses 
relied on the location of participants and the results of a survey distributed to residents of 
Urbana
5
.  The full survey can be found in Appendix A of this document.  The survey was 
designed to elicit information that could be used to answer questions about the relationship 
between neighborhood social capital and program participation, as well as to learn the ways in 
which information on the program was transferred.  Questions pertaining to the respondent’s 
general interaction with his or her neighbors, and communication about the program were used 
to construct four social capital variables used in the Social Analysis section.  A summary of the 
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 1 therm=100,000 BTUs= the energy in 100 cubic feet of natural gas 
4
 The expected useful life of air sealing is 15 years, attic insulation is 20 years, and wall insulation is 30 years. 
5
 The sample selection process and distribution method for the survey will be discussed in further detail in the social 
analysis section. 
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composition of those variables can be found in Table 3.  The survey also asked about the 
respondent’s program participation and allowed for additional comments to explain his or her 
participation decision. Housing information important to program eligibility, such as ownership 
status and the year the home was built, is also included.  Finally, socio-demographic data, 
including age, income and education, were collected to compare the sample to the overall 
population. Because of the drop-off/pick-up survey method utilized (described in further detail in 
the social analysis section), the location of the response was able to be recorded.  To protect the 
privacy of the respondent, only the Census block was recorded as responses were collected.  As 
the summary statistics in Table 4 demonstrate, the respondents in the sample are significantly 
older than the general population, with higher incomes and educational attainments.  Inferring 
broader conclusions based on the results should be done with caution as the sample was not 
representative.  The year of home construction is consistent across the two groups, which is 
important since it is a large determinant in the processes studied.   
 The literature suggested that the information available through a home energy audit 
could have a large impact on retrofit uptake.  Therefore, the list of audited households is utilized 
in the analysis of retrofit participation.  Also, it is hypothesized that the location of the 
participating households matters as households located closer to each other are more likely to 
share information and experiences with the program than households farther apart.  Therefore, 
the rounded addresses were all geocoded and mapped in ArcGIS.  The spatial distribution of 
participating households in each stage of the program can be found in Figures 1 and 2.  The 
potential relationship between location and information transfer is explored in the spatial analysis 
section. 
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4.3 Household Characteristics 
Data on the physical housing stock as well as the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
occupants is predicted to be important in the analysis of the decision to participate because of 
their effects on potential savings from increased efficiency and attitudes towards such projects.  
The City of Urbana Tax Assessor’s Office provided information on the housing stock in the 
town.  This dataset included, for each house in Urbana with less than three units at one address, 
the year built, square footage and total value.  This is important for the analysis because older 
homes are likely to have less insulation and therefore be eligible for the subsidy while also 
having larger potential energy savings.  Larger homes might also have more potential savings 
available because of the larger area requiring heating.  Housing values are used as a control 
between neighborhoods.  These addresses were also geocoded using ArcGIS and serve as the 
background population for the spatial analysis.  This data makes an appropriate background 
population because it only includes housing units with less than three units, likely excluding 
many of the rental populations. 
The city reports 8,436 households in this dataset.  The average year built is 1959 while 
20% were built since 2000.  These newer homes may not have been eligible for the wall 
insulation subsidy because they most likely would have existing insulation.  60% of the homes 
were built before 1970, which would make them likely candidates for retrofits since insulation in 
homes became more popular during the energy crisis of the 1970s.  The houses in the dataset 
have an average area of 1581 square feet and are valued at an average of $44,730 for the housing 
structure. 
To complement the housing stock information, 2010 Census data is used to provide 
socioeconomic characteristics at the Census block level.  Two important variables (median 
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household income and educational attainment) were not available at the block level for the most 
recent Census.  The best available data was from 2000 Census block groups and was 
disaggregated to the block level for 2010 blocks based on corresponding ID numbers
6
.  Between 
2000 and 2010 the Census redesigned the block system, leaving some of the 2010 blocks with no 
simple conversion to 2000 designations.  Those blocks are missing data on these variables. This 
method of disaggregation may cause issues with spatial dependence and future work should 
consider spatial interpolation methods to create a smoother dataset and limit the biasing effects 
of disaggregation.  The characteristics of this city are somewhat unique, as seen in Table 5, 
because it is the location of a University of Illinois campus, which has an enrollment of over 
40,000 students (UIUC Division of Management Information, 2012). As a college town, 
Urbana’s population has higher than average educational attainment and a higher rate of renting 
homes.  The large number of rental properties is particularly important for this research because 
only home owners where eligible for the city program, and in general, renters have less power to 
make decisions regarding their homes insulation.   
4.4 Data Limitations 
Although there is a variety of data available for this study, there are significant 
limitations because of the assorted scales.  First, because the addresses of program participation 
provided by the city are rounded to the nearest hundred, the location of the household when 
geocoded will be approximate.  The nature of Census blocks often results in odd and even houses 
on the same street segment being assigned to different Census blocks.  Therefore, if all of the 
participants appear as even number addresses, the households that in actuality are odd will be 
placed in the wrong block but there is no way of knowing for which observations this is true.  In 
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 The first 12 numbers of the block ID correspond to a block group ID.   
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the econometric analysis, this should not bias the results because this error is constant across all 
observations, however it will increase the overall error in the models run.  Also, if there were 
multiple participants per street segment, they would have the same coordinates which may cause 
a problem for the cluster analysis.  Because of the grid block system used in most of the town, 
however, the actual location of the household is not likely to be more than 50 yards away from 
the geocoded location of the rounded address. 
A related limitation is the varying scales of data utilized and the aggregation and 
disaggregation necessary to match the datasets.  The US Census block is the unit of observation 
for most of the analyses, forcing the city household level data to be aggregated up and Census 
data at the block group level to be disaggregated down.  In addition to the fact that the 
disaggregated data does not provide as fine details as the smaller scale data, some observations 
are lost to the analysis because they cannot be appropriately matched between datasets.   
Lastly, any survey data introduces a concern for non-response bias.  The distribution 
method used for this survey does not typically yield a high response rate, which can make it 
difficult to find significant results.  It also introduces non-response bias, for example, if 
households who were familiar with the program were more likely to respond than those who did 
not.  This would only present a problem if it is likely that the bias is systematically related to the 
variables of interest.  The information analyzed from the survey deals with the respondent’s 
social influences and neighborhood relationships.  It is not used for participation values so the 
bias introduced by respondents being more familiar with the program is not expected to be large.  
It could be a concern that the person filling out the survey was not the same person who holds 
the majority of the decision making power in relation to home improvements.  If this is the case, 
the responses might not explain the observed outcomes with much clarity.  The potential issues 
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associated with non-response bias and concerns specific to this dataset will be discussed further 
in the social analysis section. 
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Part V. Analysis 
 The effects of economic incentives, household characteristics, information provision, and 
social pressures will be examined through a variety of tests which will utilize methodology from 
spatial, econometric and social analyses.  First, spatial analysis techniques, including Kernel 
density estimation and tests for diffusion and cluster, will be utilized to test for unusual spatial 
patterns in participation.  Any evidence of clustering or dispersion could suggest that information 
or social pressures shared locally between neighbors could have an effect on participation, 
suggesting it would be more likely for a household to participate if it is located near an earlier 
participant.  The density estimates will also point out areas of town where participation was 
higher than expected given the background population of eligible households.  
 Next, participation each of the two stages will be estimated using econometric models.  
Participation in the home energy audit stage will be estimated at the Census block level, with the 
dependent variable defined as the number of audited households per block. A zero-inflated 
Poisson model is used to estimate this decision because of the count nature of the dependent 
variable, along with the large number of blocks with zero audit participants.  This model will test 
the effects of household characteristics (both traits of the physical housing unit and the resident 
demographics) on the decision to schedule an energy audit.   
 Retrofit participation will also be modeled at the Census block level.  An ordered Probit 
model is utilized to estimate the likelihood a block has zero participants, one participant, or more 
than one participant.  This model makes use of the data provided in the retrofitted households 
dataset concerning the financial aspects of the undertaken projects including project cost, 
estimated gas savings and incentives available.  A Heckman sample selection model is utilized to 
estimate these values for all households that received an audit because those households would 
  
27 
 
have this information even though it was not available in the dataset.  This analysis tests the 
effects of economic incentives, as well as the household characteristics tested in the audit 
participation estimation, and audit participation itself on the decision to retrofit. 
 The final analysis employs the survey data to examine the effect of social capital and 
information provision on block level participation rates.  Propensity scores based on the 
likelihood of a block to have at least one retrofit are used to create pairs containing one block 
with a participant and one block with no participants.  A paired t-test is run to determine whether 
or not blocks with at least one retrofit participant have higher levels of various social capital 
scores than those blocks with no retrofit participation.  These results will support the notion that 
social pressure and information provision from neighbors are important factors in the likelihood 
of a block to contain program participants. 
5.1 Spatial Patterns in Participation 
 Both information effects and social pressures are influences on behavior that can be 
found within the context of neighborhoods.  If one neighbor has a good experience with a retrofit 
project and tells his or her neighbors, they may be more likely to participate because of the 
reduction in uncertainty and the signal that the behavior would be socially acceptable.  Even 
without a verbal exchange of opinions, a sign in a neighbor’s yard indicating an insulation 
company working might create awareness for the program in that area causing nearby 
households to at least consider undertaking a project of their own.  If this is the case, we might 
expect to see clusters of participation within the town.  Evidence of a spatial relationship 
between participants would support investment in recruiting a group of geographically diverse 
early adopters and encouraging them to share their experience with their neighbors.  Support for 
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this hypothesis would also suggest visual cues of participation, such as a sign indicating a 
retrofitted house, would be a beneficial component of future programs.   
To explore potential spatial patterns, Kernel density estimation results are used to find 
which census blocks have above average participation in either the audit or retrofit stages of the 
Urbana program, controlling for factors including the number of households, the age of the 
home, and the number of owner occupied homes.  Next, the possibility of diffusion of participant 
locations over time is explored visually through a times series of maps.  Additionally, the spatial 
analysis software SatScan is used to identify statistically significant clusters of participants.  
Results from the Kernel density estimation ratios will be used to examine what other factors 
might be responsible for the high density participation areas while knowing the significance of 
clusters from SatScan will explain the spatial relationship between actual and potential 
participants.  Evidence of diffusion over time would provide further support for the importance 
of information sharing and social pressures within neighborhoods. 
Kernel density estimation (KDE) creates field data which assigns density values to small 
grid cells located across the study area based on point data.  The values are estimated based on 
the amount of events found within a given distance of each cell.  The created field data can be 
visually examined to see hotspots, and further, field values can be extracted and further analyzed 
in a statistical manner.   
To find hotspots in program participation, a series of estimations were calculated using 
ArcGIS.  All kernel density estimations were calculated with a grid size of 20 meters and a 
varying bandwidth as given by the ArcGIS default value (the shortest extent of the study area 
divided by 30).  The default bandwidth was selected because it worked best with the selected 
extraction technique.  The average raster values are calculated for each block making it 
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important that the effect of events are large enough to show variation in the data but not 
smoothed so much that the effects spill into neighboring blocks enough to skew their averages. 
KDE’s of audit and retrofit participants’ geocoded locations were estimated separately.  
The rounded addresses of participant locations cause slight concern but since it is uniformly the 
case for all observations, it should not introduce any biases.  It may cause more concentrated hot 
spots as multiple participants in a street segment will be assigned to the same location.   
As seen in Figure 3, the audit participants appear to be clustered more in the western part 
of town.  While clusters are evident, the map is not dominated by a few clusters; rather the 
pattern can be described by many smaller hotspots.  The retrofit kernel density map (Figure 4) 
exhibits less smoothness and more defined hotspots than the audit map.  The overall extent of the 
retrofit map is smaller than the audits as well.   
While these patterns are visually interesting, alone they do not say much about 
participation because they do not control for any other phenomenon that could be related to the 
locations of participants.  For example, it could be that the apparent hotspots in these density 
maps are simply clusters of households, while the low density areas are uninhabited.  Urbana has 
a fairly dense population center surrounded by rural areas, so this is likely to be the case.  To 
ameliorate this problem, a second series of KDEs are created to serve as background populations 
for the participation density maps.  The next stage of the analysis uses the background 
populations to create ratios of the densities of participants against the density of the background 
population.  The selection of background population is important because the goal is to locate 
areas where the participation is higher, or lower, than expected.  An appropriate background 
population will provide the location of eligible houses where participants might be located.  
Density maps of the background populations also provide visual evidence of similar spatial 
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dependencies between the explanatory characteristics, such as year of construction and number 
of occupied units, with the observed outcomes.  This is important to note since the econometric 
models do not control for spatial autocorrelation. 
The first population used for comparison is the set of all households with less than three 
units in the structure.  While the original dataset from the city did not include large apartment 
buildings, it did still contain townhouse complexes with extremely high population density as 
long as each unit had a unique address. For this analysis, these complexes were reduced to only 
three observations each, giving a more accurate picture of the eligible population.  Leaving these 
complexes in the dataset would create areas with outlier values for background household 
density and make the visualization of true patterns of participation compared to eligible 
households difficult.  The geographic extent of this data is slightly larger than that of the 
participation data, as can be seen in Figure 5.  Here, as was the case with the audit map, the 
clusters are not very distinct however the density seems to be the highest in the east-central 
portion of the city. 
For the second background population (Figure 6), the household dataset is further 
reduced to only include homes built before 1975.  It is expected that these older homes initially 
have less insulation, and therefore would be eligible for all subsidies (including those with the 
requirement that there be no existing insulation), while also having high potential savings.   In 
comparing the two background populations, it is evident that the city has been expanding since 
1975.  There are no dominating hotspots in the older homes map, but the density is clearly 
concentrated in the center of town.  This density map exhibits similar patterns to that of the audit 
map.  This is important in later analysis because it shows that some of the spatial variation in 
participation is controlled for because of the inclusion of the year of home construction variable. 
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The final characteristic that could define an eligible household background population is 
ownership status (Figure 7).  Since this data was not available at the household level, a kernel 
density estimation based on point data cannot be completed.  Instead, a ratio is constructed for 
this characteristic using the average density estimation and number of owner occupied 
households for each Census block.  This ratio cannot be directly compared to the other two in 
absolute terms but the relative high participation areas will still be relevant. 
Ratios were then constructed of the participation density values versus the background 
population for each of the three comparisons variables.  The unit of observation for the ratio 
comparison was the Census block level.  Using ArcGIS, the average kernel density value of 
participation and background estimates were calculated for each block in Urbana. Six ratios were 
then calculated using the average participation densities and control values (those being either 
average density values or number of occupied units) for each block.   
After the initial ratios were mapped, it was apparent that there was an issue with 
spillovers occurring between blocks.  Some blocks appeared to have very high ratios, signifying 
higher than expected participation, but when looked at more closely, they actually had no 
participants.  For an example, see the Figure 8, which show the location of the background 
household populations and the retrofitting households, as well as the kernel density estimation of 
retrofit participants for a small section of Urbana.  The block labeled 1001 appeared to have a 
high ratio and therefore high levels of participation in the associated block ratio map.  However, 
a closer examination reveals that this block contains no background households.  The 
misrepresentation occurred because of the retrofit participants in the adjacent block whose 
smoothed density effect spilled over into the block that in reality has no participants.   
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In an effort to reduce the problem of spillover effects, the same analysis was run at the 
block group
7
 level, based on the reasoning that the effect would be lessened because there are 
less boundaries in the larger scale data over which spillovers could occur.  This analysis led to 
even more misrepresentation on the map, where some block groups with very few households 
were greatly skewed by nearby kernel density hotspots.  Instead, the final decision was to 
analyze at the initial choice of block level and recode ratios for blocks with zero background 
population as “0”.  This choice allows for the blocks that truly have higher than expected 
participation to stand out. 
First looking at the ratio of audits to the background populations in Figures 9, 10, and 11, 
the patterns highlight that the three background populations do not generate the same results.  
The map displaying the ratio of audits to all households (Figure 9) shows a variety of spatially 
diverse blocks with high values.  The variation in values is not completely random however, and 
one can see certain areas of town have clusters of higher values, such as the west-central section.  
One block in the southeast corner looks to have a particularly high ratio and deserves further 
exploration. Interestingly, the average year of construction in this block is 2004.  There are a 
number of audit cases near but not in the block that add to the density value through the spillover 
effects described previously, however the surrounding blocks share similar characteristics and 
therefore the analysis suggests that this area has relatively high participation rates. 
When the background population is reduced to only include households built before 1975 
the variances between the block ratios is decreased, as seen in Figure 10.  Most blocks appear to 
have very low ratios with only a few blocks in the eastern half of the town showing high ratios.  
There are few older homes in this area which would partially explain the high values.  The high 
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 Block groups are larger units than blocks.  There are 45 2010 US Census block groups in Urbana. 
  
33 
 
participation on top of the low background population is an interesting trend which motivates 
further explanation of the reasons for participation.   
Finally, mapping the ratio of audit kernel density to number of owner occupied 
households presents a cluster of higher-value blocks near the city center (Figure 11).  The results 
here might be slightly skewed due to the variation in size and population between blocks. In the 
center of the city, the size of the blocks is about equivalent to what one might think of as a city 
block, while on the periphery of town a block could be big enough to encompass an entire 
subdivision.  Therefore, a small but significant high density area outside of the city center might 
not appear as a high ratio because the large block encompasses many households which cancel 
out the cluster.  In future work, point data for ownership status would be extremely useful in 
mitigating this effect.  The results are still noteworthy because they suggests that in the city 
center, there was a high level of participation even though there are not a high number of owner 
occupied households.  Looking further into the block characteristics reveals that the houses in 
that area are much older than average, with average block years of construction ranging from 
1897 to 1912.  This could explain the higher than average ratio values and motivate an extension 
of creating a background population which includes controls for both ownership and age of each 
household.  
Comparing retrofit participation to the background populations reveals similar, but not 
identical, patterns as the audit analysis.  First, generating the ratio of retrofit density to all 
households creates a diverse map with high and low values varying spatially, which can be seen 
in Figure 12.  A block in the southeast, different from that which was prominent in the audit 
analysis, appears to have high levels of participation even though, like the block in the audit 
analysis, it is comprised of newer homes.  When using the households built before 1975 as the 
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background population (Figure 13), a few of the blocks remain highlighted.  The large block in 
the southeast section of the city is important to note because it had participation even though the 
average home was built in 2004.  While the year built is believed to be a significant predictor of 
potential savings from retrofitting, it is not the only factor, and there are still instances where 
newer homes can benefit from undertaking an insulation upgrade project.  Only when the ratio is 
created in terms of owner occupied households (Figure 14) does the pattern change.  In this map, 
once again the high values are clustered near the city center.  This suggests that although the 
blocks of newer homes appeared to have higher levels of participation, this could be attributed to 
the fact that the blocks with older households also tend to have more renters.  When the renters 
are removed from the background population, the high instance of participation in older homes 
near the city center becomes more evident. It is also important to note that the blocks highlighted 
in the analyses presented thus far do not continue to be extreme values in the retrofit KDE ratio 
tests, meaning despite their high density of audited households, they did not have high levels of 
participation in the retrofit stage.  It is likely that homeowners of newer homes are not less likely 
to receive an audit but are less likely to retrofit because an audit of a newer home will likely not 
reveal the opportunity for large cost savings measures.  Scheduling a free home energy audit may 
have more to do with socioeconomic characteristics than the physical housing structure, while 
investment in upgraded insulation is more dependent on the opportunity for savings.  These 
hypotheses will be explored in the follow econometric analysis section. 
One additional map (Figure 15) was created to compare the kernel density estimations of 
retrofitting and audited houses to identify areas where households decided to continue to the 
second stage of the program after receiving an audit.  While audits were not a prerequisite to 
receive the subsidy, most retrofitted households did first complete an audit, presumably to gain 
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more information before making a large investment.  The more important step, in regards to 
reducing energy demand, is the retrofit.  Therefore a successful program would move all 
households that received an audit report which recommended cost effective retrofits to go 
forward with the project.  Without knowing more about the savings offered to the households 
that did not retrofit, it is difficult to know whether the blocks that have low ratios of audits to 
retrofits had less to gain through retrofitting, and therefore decided the cost was not worth the 
predicted benefit, or if some other characteristic of the block made them less likely to continue 
with the program even when offered cost effective solutions.   Because of the relatively small 
number of retrofit participants, the results displayed in this map are extremely sensitive.  For 
example, the highlighted block in the central part of the city seems to have had many retrofits per 
audit, when in reality it only had two audits in the vicinity of the block, one of which was also a 
retrofit.  A 50% rate is very high, as many of the more densely populated areas had more audit 
cases close enough to factor into their background population density.  If one more or less 
homeowner had participated in the program in some of the sensitive areas, the results could look 
much different. 
While kernel density estimation can reveal important hotspots in program participation, 
the choice of background population can greatly alter the results.  After considering various 
options along with the results and program requirements, the number of owner occupied units 
per block appears to be the most suitable control.  Mapping these ratios reveals a cluster of above 
average participation in the center of town which, in addition to the year of construction, may be 
explained by the types of neighbor to neighbor interactions that occur in densely populated areas.  
This potential participation determinant will be further examined as part of the social capital 
analysis. 
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Although there may be limitations with the data, especially in regards to the extraction 
and geocoding processes, the results provide a useful insight into the spatial aspect of 
participation in energy efficiency programs.  The results suggest that while retrofitting is more 
related to the estimated potential for savings, audit participation is likely to be explained by 
characteristics unrelated to the housing structure.  The econometric analysis in the following 
section will further test these hypotheses.  If this continues to be true, a new program might 
consider adding stricter eligibility requirements to receive an audit.  Eliminating the subsidies for 
audits on households that are not likely to have any suggested retrofits would allow for greater 
rebates to be offered for those households that do have high potential for energy savings.  
Another potentially important spatial pattern of participation is diffusion.  If participation 
started with a small number of early adopting households and grew outwardly from there, it 
would support a hypothesis presented later in this research that participation was at least partially 
motivated by some combination of peer pressure and information sharing between neighbors.  To 
test for an existence of such a phenomenon, first a series of maps were created to show 
participation at varying points in time, as seen in Figure 16.   
These maps show that distinguishing a pattern of diffusion would be difficult
8
.  The 
majority of early adopters were located in the southern half of the town, somewhat close to the 
town center.  After the initial two months of the program, the extent of participation had more or 
less covered the entire town whose boundary creates a limit to further expansion (Figure 16b).  
From that point in times, additional participants filled in the existing extent rather than continue 
an outward expansion.  One explanation for the lack of overall diffusion could be that the 
majority of social networks in the town are not geographic.  Instead of assuming information and 
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 An additional test was run to see if the distance from a participant to the nearest early adopter increased over time.  
This test of diffusion also did not find any evidence of that particular spatial pattern. 
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peer pressure as related to household matters is passed from neighbor to neighbor, it may be that 
these influences are passed through social networks that are not defined by neighborhood, such 
as church membership or workplace interactions.  In the social network analysis section of this 
research, this possibility will be explored further. 
Another possible pattern of participation uptake is clustering.  If participation was 
clustered, participating households would be located closer together than they would if they were 
randomly distributed around town.  A clustering pattern could be explained by neighborhood 
information sharing and peer pressure where households are more likely to participate if 
someone nearby has also participated. This pattern might be more reasonable to expect than a 
diffusion pattern because it can allow the transfer of information to increase the density of 
participants, not just expand the extent.  A cluster analysis was performed using a Bernoulli 
distribution model and used the set of all households as the background population.  The model 
was first run with the default of 50% maximum cluster size. The maximum cluster size sets a 
limit to the percentage of participating households that can be included in one cluster.  The result 
of this analysis suggested there was one large cluster composed of over 200 households at a high 
level of significance (P<0.001).  Even though this may be statistically accurate, there is little 
practical use of this result since so many households were included.  The model was run again, 
with a maximum cluster size of 15%, which revealed similar results.  With the 15% maximum 
size model, the secondary clusters included another large cluster of 103 houses (P<0.001) and 
two other small clusters that were significant at the 5% level.  The cluster analysis does not 
control for household characteristics that might vary spatially, and therefore further exploration 
into the cause of the cluster is needed.  
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A spatial analysis of program participation suggests that program participation occurred 
over a wide extent of the city, within which significant clusters and hot spots can be found.  It 
also appears that participation occurred in clusters that grew in density over time, not outwardly 
in a typical diffusion pattern.  The results of the Kernel density estimation analysis suggest that 
there were some areas that had a high density of audits but did not have many older homes, while 
retrofit densities were more related to the older home background population.  What the spatial 
techniques employed in this research cannot explain is the possible causes of these hotspots and 
patterns.  For that reason, further econometric and statistical analysis will be used to offer 
explanations of these abnormal regions. 
5.2 Motivating Factors of Audit Participation 
For many residents of Urbana who increased their homes' energy efficiency through the 
city program, the first step was scheduling a free home energy audit.  Although not a prerequisite 
to receive a subsidy, the information provided by the energy advisor could greatly reduce the 
uncertainty and risk of undertaking a renovation.  While the audits were "free", there are always 
opportunity costs and various barriers to scheduling an audit that should be considered.  
Identifying the characteristics that make a household more likely to receive an audit can help 
future program organizers strategically target groups of potential participants. 
There has not been much focus in the previous literature on the decision to schedule a 
home energy audit, mostly because it is the decision to retrofit that brings about the ultimate 
desired outcome of reduced energy use.  Encouraging homeowners to have an energy audit is 
important because, through information provision, audit reports can lead to efficient retrofit 
uptake and a decrease in demand for energy.  To encourage audit participation in the future, it is 
important to first understand which factors can be used to predict current participation.  As 
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suggested from the Kernel density estimation results, household sociodemographic 
characteristics may be more important than physical characteristics of the housing structure for 
the audit stage.  This analysis will test the effect of various household demographics and physical 
structure characteristics to further explore this hypothesis. 
Due to the lack of specific household level data, Census blocks are used as the unit of 
observation, and therefore the outcome of interest is the number of households audited in the 
block.  Most of the Census data was provided at this scale, and the Census data at block group 
level (median income and education) was disaggregated to each of the blocks as previously 
discussed.  Audit participation was aggregated to create a variable representing the number of 
audits per block.  Through program completion 312 Census blocks had at least one audit 
participant. 46% of all blocks had zero audits and the mean participation per block was 1.52 
households.  A complete distribution of the number of audited households per block can be 
found in Figure 17. 
This analysis seeks to estimate the effects of various block characteristics on the 
likelihood the block will experience certain levels of participation in the audit program.  The 
model assumes the number of households that received an audit per block is a function of the 
average year the homes were built, the number of owner occupied households, the average 
square feet of the homes, the percentage of the population that graduated college, the percentage 
of the population over 65 years old, and the median household income of the block.  These 
explanatory variables include characteristics that could represent available energy savings (such 
as the average year of construction and average square footage), as well as socioeconomic 
characteristics (which could be important in terms of the opportunity costs of hosting an auditor 
and likelihood of environmental concern).  Since the number of households per block that got an 
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audit is count data, and a large proportion of the sample (46% of the blocks) did not have any 
participants, a zero-inflated Poisson is utilized.   
Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) models use a Poisson distribution to estimate the log of the 
expected number of outcomes.   The results of a Poisson regression are interpreted by 
considering that a one unit change in the independent variable (block characteristics) will result 
in a change in the log of the expected count (number of audits) represented by the coefficient 
estimate, assuming all other independent variables are held constant.  However, the large 
proportion of blocks with no participants requires a modification to the model.  While some of 
the blocks with zero participants might have had eligible households that did not participate for 
reasons represented in the general participation model, other blocks with zero participants may 
have had no audited households because of a different process, for example, they did not contain 
any eligible households, as would be the case if the block had only rental properties.  Since the 
processes generating these outcomes are distinct, the zero-inflated Poisson is utilized.   
The first step in the ZIP model is to estimate a Logit model which predicts whether or not 
a block will have zero participants.  A level of zero participation is modeled as a function of 
number of owner occupied households because it was an eligibility requirement for the program 
and blocks with all renters are certain to have no participants regardless of other characteristics.  
The second stage of the estimation uses a Poisson model to predict the number of participants for 
each of the predicted non-zero blocks.  This model uses the average year the homes were 
constructed, average square footage, number of owner occupied homes, percent of population 
over 65 years, percent of population with bachelor’s degrees or higher, median household 
income and percent of population over 65 years old per block to predict participation level.   
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It is expected that blocks with older homes will have more participation because the 
houses are likely to be less insulated, and relatedly, blocks with larger homes would also see 
more participants because of higher demand for heating fuel and thus, expected savings.  While 
having an audit alone will not realize these savings, it seems reasonable that households that 
believe they may have the potential to save would be more likely than those who do not expect 
high savings potential to get an audit.  As previously stated, blocks with more owners would be 
expected to have more participation because it represents a larger background population of 
eligible homes.  The percentage of the block population over 65 is included because of the 
opportunity cost of scheduling and hosting an auditor.  Retired homeowners may have an easier 
time being available for an audit and do not have to lose wages to do so.  The educational 
attainment of the homeowners is expected to be positively related to the number of participants 
because those with higher education levels tend to have higher rates of environmental concern, 
as previously stated in literature review section.  Median household income is also included, 
although the literature does not provide unanimous support for a clear hypothesis of the direction 
of its effect.  If homeowners do not have a sufficient amount of disposable income they are less 
likely to be able to make the large upfront costs of the project which might discourage them from 
having an audit, while on the other hand, homeowners with lower incomes might be more 
interested in learning about potential savings before making a risky investment. 
Two specifications of the zero-inflated Poisson model differing in their definition of the 
year of construction parameter are run.  The first specification includes the average year of 
construction for the block as a continuous variable.  While this allows for the calculation of 
marginal effects, a difference of one year would not capture any differences in insulation 
technology and building codes over the various eras of home construction.  Therefore, a second 
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model is run which instead includes a dummy variable which indicates whether or not the block 
average year of construction is before 1975.  This allows a comparison of “older” versus “newer” 
homes not captured in the continuous specification.  The results of these regressions are 
presented in Table 6.   
The choice of zero-inflated Poisson over the standard Poisson is supported by the results 
of a Vuong test (P<0.001) for both specifications.  Generally, the magnitudes and significance of 
the other variables are very similar between the two models, excluding the housing age variable.  
In both estimations of the logistic model, the number of owners appears a highly significant 
predictor of a block having zero participants, with an increase of one owner occupied household 
resulting in a decrease in the likelihood of being a zero by exp(-0.2286572) =1.257 in the initial 
model.  The second stage Poisson model estimates that the number of owners (1% significance), 
percent of residents with college educations and median household income (both 5% 
significance) are important predictor variables in both specifications.  The effect of the number 
of owners is positive, as expected, and suggests that the addition of one owner occupied 
household would increase the expected participation count by a factor of about 1 (exp 
(0.019878)) in the initial model.  The effect of median household income is also significant and 
positive in both models, perhaps suggesting that in this setting, higher income households have 
the ability to finance these projects, and therefore are more likely to participate in an audit as the 
initial phase.  Interestingly, the average square footage of the households is not significant.  It 
may be that the in averaging this characteristic over the block, important variability is lost.  It is 
also somewhat correlated with income (correlation coefficient of 0.354) and percent of 
population with college educations (correlation coefficient of 0.464) which may account for its 
low significance level.  Finally, the year of construction is not significant as a continuous 
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variable, but as a dummy, is shown to have high significance (significant at the 1% level).  
Within blocks, the average standard deviation of year of construction is 13.2 years, which could 
be large enough to suggest that an average value might not be a good representation of all houses 
in the block, partially explaining the lack of significance in the first model.  It could also be that 
the second specification better captures the differences in home construction as it relates to time.     
The significance of additional owner occupied households is not surprising as it is a 
direct eligibility requirement for the program.  It does, however, highlight an opportunity for 
program expansion to include rental properties.  Although this would introduce more 
complexities in coordinating landlord and tenant decisions, and would probably not see as high 
levels of participation due to potential agency problems, it would still be beneficial for the city to 
consider given the large number of rental properties.  The positive relationship with higher 
educated blocks could suggest that the information provided about the program needs to be more 
clearly explained, however it is likely that this relationship has more to do with environmental 
attitudes and education levels than the ability to understand program details.  Therefore, in 
Census blocks with lower average educational attainment, the financial benefits of the program 
can be the focus of marketing materials while in areas with higher levels of educational 
attainment, the focus could be on the reduction of emissions and environmental benefits.  
Finally, the positive relationship between income and participation suggests more can be done to 
assist low income households realize the energy savings by offering additional financing options 
or providing the subsidy in such a way that the homeowner is not responsible for the initial 
funding.  This would add an element of economic justice to the energy efficiency program. 
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5.3 Motivating Factors of Retrofit Participation 
The overall goal of the Urbana-Ameren program was to decrease demand for home 
heating fuel.  To reach this goal, it was important that households go further than the home 
energy audit and undertake the suggested retrofit projects.  While the audits provide important 
information, it is the retrofit that reduces the negative externalities associated with fuel usage and 
saves the homeowners money.  Understanding the motivating factors behind the decision to 
retrofit can assist future programs to encourage more homeowners to move from the audit to the 
retrofit stage of efficiency improvement.   
The effects of household characteristics, economic incentives and information provision 
will all be tested in this analysis.  As was the case with the decision to audit, both demographic 
and housing stock characteristics are expected to have an impact on participation.  More so than 
in the audit stage, the expected costs and savings of a project are likely to play a role in the 
decision because this stage involved upfront payments.  Also, it is hypothesized that audited 
households are more likely to retrofit than those that did not because of the additional 
information gained through that process. 
 The analysis of retrofit participation again was completed at the block level.  Instead of 
including all blocks, only the blocks that had a participant in either the audit or retrofit (or both) 
are included.  The participants in the audit stage received information about estimated project 
costs and energy savings that are expected to be important factors in the decision to retrofit.  In 
order to include those variables in the model, only the blocks that received that information are 
analyzed.  Unfortunately, in this dataset, the information provided during the audit stage is only 
available for households that retrofitted.  Because of the expected importance of these variables, 
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values for select audit report figures are imputed using a Heckman sample selection model 
(Heckman, 1979). 
In order to run this analysis, several manipulations of the data were necessary.  These 
operations were performed at the household level and the completed dataset was then aggregated 
to the block level.  The first step in creating this dataset was to generate a list of participating 
households free of duplicates.  Ideally, this would mean combing observations in the audit and 
retrofit datasets that represent the same house, but because the data does not include a unique 
identifier for each household and all addresses are rounded, precisely matching retrofits to their 
audit observation was not possible.  Instead, if a retrofitted household also had an audit, it was 
matched with an observation in the audit dataset in the same street segment that had an audit 
closest to the retrofit date, but at least one month prior to allow time for scheduling a contractor.  
This method of matching, while not perfect, should not limit the interpretation of the 
results because the purpose of combining the datasets was only to eliminate double counting of 
households that participated in both stages of the program.  The only data available for with the 
audit stage is the date of the audit, which is not used in the regressions and therefore precise 
matching is not required.  Because the address provided for participants is rounded, household 
specific characteristics cannot be used, and instead Census block averages were applied to each 
household based on the location.  Some of the retrofitted homes did not have an audit and 
therefore were left as unique observations.  The resulting dataset represents 852
9
 program 
participants in 312 Census blocks. 
                                                     
9
 The 852 households include 17 that retrofitted with no program audit, 120 which completed both stages of the 
program, and 727 that had an audit with no retrofit. 
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For each participating household, values for total incentives received, estimated yearly 
gas savings, and final project cost before and after rebates were imputed using a Heckman 
sample selection model to control for the fact that these variables are only observed for the 
households that chose to retrofit.  To not account for sample selection could create a bias because 
one could assume that those who participated did so in part because of high expected savings, 
while those who did not participate did not value the savings enough to participate.  The 
Heckman model corrects for sample selection by first predicting the binary discrete choice of 
participation and subsequently predicting the outcome of interest (the audit report figure), 
conditional on selection into the program as estimated in the first stage.  The outcome of interest 
in the second stage equation is only observed if the household performed a retrofit. 
All of the imputed project values were estimated based on the same variables. The first 
stage, the decision to retrofit, uses a Probit equation to model likelihood of having an audit as a 
function of housing characteristics (average year built, averages square footage, and average 
value) and block socioeconomic characteristics (percent of population over 65, number of owner 
occupied units, percent of population to graduate college, and median household income).  The 
array of variables used here is very similar to that used to estimate audit participation with the 
zero-inflated Poisson model in the previous analysis.   
The results of this first stage estimation can be seen in Table 7.  Unlike the results from 
the audit ZIP model, the only significant variable in the selection to retrofit is the average year of 
construction for the block where the household is located.  This does make intuitive sense since 
older homes are more likely to lack proper insulation and therefore have more potential energy 
cost savings available through a retrofit.  While a household might have had a free audit for 
various reasons including preferences for environmental conservation, or more spare time to host 
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an auditor, to complete a retrofit was a large investment and would most likely only be taken on 
by households who stood to gain significant savings. 
 The second stage of the Heckman model estimated project costs, subsidies, and energy 
savings conditional on selection into the retrofit stage.  These figures are solely a function of the 
housing structure and household energy use, and therefore the only independent variables 
included are the average year of construction for homes in the block of the household, and the 
average square footage of homes in the block.  Block level averages are still used even though 
this model is estimating at the household level because of the rounded addresses not allowing for 
precise matching to household level data.  Second stage regression results for each of the 
predicted values are presented in Table 8.  The year of construction was highly significant in the 
prediction of each of the outcome values, which again is an intuitive result.  The average square 
footage is not significant in almost all of the estimations.  One possible explanation for the lack 
of relationship could be an issue with the use of the mean block values and the within-block 
variance. The estimated outcomes were saved for all observations, including those with known 
outcomes, and are included in the model of retrofit participation to reduce the bias of the imputed 
values.  
The Wald χ2 tests for each of the estimations suggests that at least one of the predictor 
variables is significant, however it does not speak to the goodness of fit of the model predictions.  
A visual comparison of actual and predicted values for retrofitted households can be seen in 
Figure 18.  It is apparent that the model does not cleanly predict these variables.  For each of the 
audit report values, large values are significantly underestimated and values near the average are 
estimated with large variance in both directions. It is possible that the outlier values are making it 
difficult for the model to predict all values.  Also, the inverse mills ratio (lambda p=0.318) 
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suggests that the selection model is not necessary in this case.  Future research should consider 
improvements to this estimation model through eliminating outliers and testing additional 
functional forms, but for this analysis, the effects and significance of these variables in the 
decision to retrofit should be interpreted with the understanding that the estimated values may 
not be as representative of the true values provided in the energy audits as would be ideal. 
 The final econometric analysis of retrofit behavior was again completed at the Census 
block level in order to make use of the socioeconomic data only available at that scope.  The 
population for this analysis was only the blocks that had at least participant in either stage of the 
program.  A variable representing the number of households that participated in the retrofit 
program, along with average estimated audit report figures, was created for each block in this 
population.  The distribution of retrofitted households per block (Figure 19) shows that the 
majority of blocks (215) had zero retrofits, with about a third as many blocks (71) having one 
retrofit.  Finally, a small number of blocks (24) had more than one retrofit. 
 Because of the high upfront costs of insulation upgrade projects, even with the 
availability of subsidies, it is not surprising that a large number of blocks included households 
that had an audit but did not perform any upgrades.  In addition to the cost of the insulation 
project, the inconvenience of a major home renovation deters many homeowners from taking 
action.  It is also possible that the audit results for many of these households suggested no 
significant improvements to the insulation should be made because it was already at an 
acceptable level.  When modeling retrofit participation, a linear model is not appropriate because 
the difference between 0 and 1 retrofit should not be interpreted the same as the difference 
between 1 and 2, or 5 and 6 retrofits.  Therefore, the blocks are divided into three bins: 0 
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retrofits, 1 retrofit and greater than 1 retrofit.  Based on these classifications, an ordered Probit 
model is used to estimate the probability of the outcome falling within each bin.   
 Ordered Probit models are based on a latent regression of an unknown parameter,   .  
While    is unknown, a value   is observed as follows (Greene, 2008). 
                
                  
                
where the values of   represent the category of retrofit participation observed.  Normalizing the 
mean and variance of the unobserved heterogeneity to zero and one gives the following 
probability equations: 
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In order to interpret the estimated coefficients in this model, the marginal effects must be 
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The coefficient estimates shift the distribution of the estimated    so that the edge regions 
become larger or smaller, depending on the sign of  .  The effect on the middle region is unable 
to be discerned without knowing the true densities (Greene, 2008).  This is a significant 
limitation to the use of this method since the distinction between the outcomes of 0 and 1 retrofit 
is important for policy implications. 
 The three imputed retrofit outcome variables are utilized in this regression to estimate the 
effect of economic incentives.  Block average total subsidy received, project cost after the 
subsidy and estimated gas savings are included in the estimation because they represent three 
distinct attributes of a potential project.  The total subsidy received represents the benefit of 
doing the retrofit with the program as opposed to installing upgrades at another point in time.  
The project cost after the subsidy is the actual cost of the potential retrofit, and the marginal 
effect will say something about the elasticity of insulation upgrades.  The total project cost 
before factoring in the subsidy is not used because it is implicitly included in the post subsidy 
cost.  The estimated gas savings deals with potential future savings, which would be important 
for homeowners interested in lowering their energy bill and those interested in decreasing their 
contribution to the resulting negative externalities of fuel use.  There is a concern that these 
attributes will exhibit multicollinearity because they are all functions of the same housing 
characteristics theoretically, and also in this study, empirically, as they have been imputed using 
a linear regression on the same housing stock variables.  They are not perfectly correlated; 
therefore all three remain in the model despite their high correlations. A correlation matrix of the 
variables used in this model is presented in Table 9.   Interpretation of their coefficients can still 
provide distinct information about the decision to retrofit even though it is not expected that they 
exhibit high levels of significance in the results of this regression.  The housing variables (year 
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of construction and square footage) are omitted from this analysis because the exhibit perfect 
multicollinearity with the variables they were used to impute.   
Intuitively, it is expected that estimated gas savings should have a positive relationship 
with retrofit uptake.  The project cost and subsidy amount received are expected to have an effect 
on the retrofit decision, however the hypothesized sign of the effect is ambiguous.  A very 
expensive project might exclude some potential households from ever completing it while it 
could encourage others to act now while there is additional financial support available.  The 
subsidy payment received is proportional to the amount of insulation installed.  Therefore a large 
subsidy payment is evidence of a large project, most likely with associated high costs and 
inconvenience.  Again, since the subsidy was only offered for a limited time, it might also 
encourage homeowners to do the project now so that they can take advantage of the savings. 
 In addition to the retrofit outcome variables, block characteristics including median 
household income, number of owner occupied households, percent of population over 65, and 
percent of population with college degrees are included as they still represent characteristics 
expected to increase likelihood of taking action.  As in the first stage of the sample selection 
model, we expect these to have less of an impact on the likelihood of more retrofits because the 
cost can be prohibitive. Finally, the number of audits in the block is included and expected to 
have a strong and positive effect on the probability.  Since most retrofitted houses first completed 
an audit, it is likely that blocks with many audit participants will have at least one retrofit 
because of the reduced uncertainty of estimated savings provided through an audit report.  In a 
second supplementary regression, all block characteristics that were found to have significant 
effects on audit participation in the ZIP model presented in the previous section are eliminated, 
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leaving only the percent of population over 65 and the number of audits to reduce the chance for 
multicollinearity in the model.  This specification is supported by a test of joint significance.  
In the first model, which includes all block averaged household characteristics, the only 
significant variable appears to be the number of audits in the block (results presented in Table 
10).  Using STATA to generate the marginal effects at the mean, the coefficient can be 
interpreted to suggest the addition of one audited house decreases the probability of the block 
having an outcome in the “zero” region by 0.0933, while increasing the probability of the block 
being in the third region (more than one retrofit) by 0.027.  While this result is expected, it is 
interesting that no other variables appear to have significant effects and their confidence intervals 
have ambiguous signs.  Possible explanations for the low levels of significance include 
multicollinearity and noisy estimation of audit report variables.  In the ZIP model for audit 
participation, it was estimated that many of the block level demographics were significant in 
predicting the number of audits per block. Therefore, they may be implicitly included in the 
model through the number of audits and therefore not display additional significance 
individually.  To determine if these demographics add to the model specification, a test of joint 
significance was performed.  The results of the test suggest that the coefficients on the 
demographic variables (number of owner occupied households, percent college graduates, and 
median household income) are no different from zero, with a P value of 0.8984.  Therefore, in 
the next iteration of the retrofit prediction model all such demographic information is dropped 
except for percent of population over 65, because it was not significant in the audit prediction 
model.  The results of this model can be found in Table 11. 
When the block variables significant in the ZIP model for audit participation are 
removed, three of the regressors are significant at the 10% level.  The number of audits in the 
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block continues to have a strong positive effect on retrofit participation.  Additionally, in this 
model estimation, the average subsidy received also has a positive effect on retrofit participation 
in blocks with audits.  The calculated marginal effects (see Table 12) suggest a $1.00 increase in 
subsidy payment result in a 0.00014 increase in the probability of being in the “more than one” 
retrofit category and decrease the probability of having 0 retrofits by 0.00047.  The average 
project cost after the subsidy is also significant and positive, with marginal effects suggesting a 
$1.00 increase in the project cost would lead to a 0.00003 increase in the probability of having 
more than one retrofit and a 0.0001017 decrease in the probability of having zero retrofits.   
Interestingly, as seen in Table 12 the model estimates a negative effect of average gas 
savings.  This is unexpected, as more gas savings leads to higher energy cost savings.  The 
savings will be correlated with cost because both are calculated as a function of square feet in the 
case of wall and attic insulation, and indirectly of cubic feet per minute air flow reduction from 
air sealing projects.  Therefore, projects that have the potential to save large amounts of energy 
over their lifetime might also be more expensive to complete, which would explain the negative 
value.  However, in contrast, the estimated coefficient on total project cost is positive, signifying 
more expensive projects are more likely to be completed (although this result is not statistically 
significant).  Another possible reason could be that the type of insulation project with the highest 
gas savings per unit is for some unobserved reason less preferred than the others.  Wall 
insulation improves energy efficiency the most of the three projects (0.37 therms per square foot) 
however only 76% of retrofitted homes chose to install additional wall insulation projects, while 
both air sealing and attic insulation both had rates of over 90% uptake. The dataset does not 
break down costs by project type, however it may be the case that wall insulation was more 
expensive than the others.  Rebates on wall insulation projects also had the additional 
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requirement that there be no existing insulation in the area, which may have deterred households 
from this particular project.  It could also be the case then when discounted to the net present 
value, the expected savings was not enough to motivate investment.  Finally, this model may not 
be able to estimate the true effect of gas savings because the estimated values used are not 
representative enough of the true values due to imperfections in the imputing process. 
The analysis of retrofit participation at the block level suggests that information provided 
by the home energy auditor is a significant factor in the decision to retrofit.  Increasing audit 
participation could increase retrofit participation with the added benefit of reducing the chance of 
inefficient projects being selected.  While the goal of this program is to reduce energy demand 
through insulation upgrades, on a broader scale there are a variety of ways to reduce energy use.  
If a household energy audit reveals that insulation upgrades would not be cost efficient, the 
household can then allocate their funds to a different efficiency or conservation measure for 
more practical results.  Some of the results in this model, including the negative relationship 
between gas savings and number of retrofits, and the positive relationship between project cost 
and participation, may seem surprising; however, they also highlight the importance of the non-
market barriers of adopting projects including the cost of the inconvenience.  
5.4 Social Capital Analysis  
While there is much to be learned about the patterns of participation from econometric 
models, it is clear that there are also previously unobserved influences on the participation 
decision. One such influence that is analyzed in this section is social pressure.  The survey 
administered to Urbana households asked questions about neighborhood interactions and 
program participation.  The data collected from this survey is used to test whether or not Census 
blocks with high measures of social capital are more likely to have retrofit participants.  In 
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addition to the strength of social capital in neighborhoods, the effect of neighbors and friends 
attitudes are explored through a series of paired t-tests.  
In order to compare social capital across neighborhoods, several indices of social 
characteristics were created, a summary of which can be found in Table 3.  The first variable G, 
the general neighborhood social capital index, serves as a measure of neighborhood social capital 
at the block level, meaning the amount of general interactions and connectedness within the 
neighborhood.  The second variable R, the program related neighborhood social capital index, 
measures the level of awareness and information about the Urbana-Ameren program the 
respondent gathered from his or her neighbors.  This transfer could occur through a personal 
interaction, such as talking to each other about the program, or simply observation based, as 
would be the case if a respondent saw a sign in a neighbor’s yard advertising an insulation 
upgrade. The third and fourth variables create measures of the direction of influence from 
members of the respondent’s social network.  Both can take positive or negative values 
depending on how the respondent perceives his or her neighbors’ and friends’ attitudes towards 
energy efficiency upgrades.  The third variable, neighborhood social influence, includes the 
effects of both how the respondent perceives their neighbors attitudes, and the influences that 
could come as a result of a neighbor participating in the program.   The fourth variable, a 
measure of non-neighbor social influence only includes perceived attitudes of family and friends 
who are not also neighbors.  It does not include knowledge of their participation because that 
category is not limited to residents of Urbana and therefore may include people who are facing 
different incentives to retrofit.  Since these two variables have slightly different constructs, they 
should not be directly compared, but rather considered independently as measures of two 
separate influences.   
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 Initially, these variables were going to be integrated into household level regression 
analysis of each stage of participation.  For the results to be extrapolated to the city in general, 
the required survey sample needed to be a large, unbiased, and representative.  Due to limited 
funding for this research, initially a convenience sampling method was chosen to reach the 
desired sample.  While this method did reach a wide audience and avoided potential non-
response bias, there were still concerns that the sample was not representative of the general 
population and furthermore, that the recorded responses might vary systematically from those 
responses not recorded.  This method was ultimately abandoned due to low participation rates 
and limited advantages over other methods in relation to nonresponse bias.  A door-to-door, 
drop-off/pick-up method, described in detail below, was selected instead as the administration 
technique for the final analysis. 
The convenience sampling survey was administered at tables by the entrances of two 
grocery store locations in town over a period of a week.  The survey was very brief and 
participants were asked to fill the survey out on the spot.  The cover letter also had a web address 
where the survey could be taken online at a later time if the potential participant opted to not fill 
it out at that time, and an address to where the survey could be mailed. The full survey and cover 
letter can be found in Appendix A.  Small pieces of candy were offered as an incentive for 
participation.   Grocery stores were chosen as the administration location because they do not 
immediately exclude any socio-demographic from the sample.  Collection times were varied to 
minimize the risk that certain demographics would be excluded due to work schedules.  Urbana 
has a range of grocery stores that vary in location, product offerings, and price.  Two of these 
stores allowed for the survey to be administered onsite: Common Ground Food Co-op and Wal-
Mart Superstore.  While each has specific characteristics that might lead us to believe the 
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respondents at that location are not representative of the population as a whole, the expected 
biases may be offsetting.   
Brøgger, et al. (2007) suggests that offering the option to complete the survey online 
actually reduces response rate.  They explain that some respondents will delay filling out the 
survey because they would prefer to do it online, but because of the postponement, they will 
forget, lose the address or change their mind, and not complete the survey online either.  The 
case of this survey is a bit different because of the convenience sampling method.  People are 
often in a hurry when they are at the grocery store and may really not have time to take the 
survey on the spot but would be willing to do it at later time.  Working with this administration 
technique, surveys were distributed for a total of eight hours over the course of a week.  In this 
time, 48 surveys were completed in person and no surveys were submitted online, supporting the 
findings of Brøgger, et al. While technically there is no response rate to report with this 
distribution method, in practice, a low proportion of shoppers were willing to stop and take the 
survey.  There is a concern that those who did take the survey were more familiar with the 
program or were more interested in energy efficiency in ways unobserved in the survey data.  
Furthermore, the low number of responses would not allow for any meaningful analysis that 
could be generalized to say something about participation in the city as a whole. 
Because of these concerns of bias, compounded by the small sample size, a new survey 
administration strategy was adopted.  The results of this preliminary survey were utilized to 
estimate the effect size to determine the sample size needed for statistical power in the second 
round of surveys.  The sample collected at the grocery store can also provide a representation of 
the city that will inform to what extent the results of the new strategy can be extrapolated to the 
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city level.  These responses are also included in a general discussion of survey results which can 
be found in Appendix B. 
The final survey administration method involved creating pairs of neighborhoods similar 
in observable characteristics, yet with different retrofit participation outcomes.  The goal of the 
survey data analysis was to determine if there is a significant difference in levels of social capital 
and positive influences in areas where there was, and was not participation.  The analysis 
requires pairs of neighborhood areas similar in all observed characteristics believed to have an 
effect on the likelihood of participation yet that had different levels of participation.  The 
matching process, described in greater detail below, created a sample of 106 blocks where the 
surveys were distributed. 
The survey was administered in these blocks using the drop-off/pick-up technique 
(modified from Steele, et al., 2001 and Londoño & Ando, 2011).  The sample was defined as all 
houses with even number addresses in the selected blocks, giving a total of 1105 households.   
Odd numbered houses were omitted from the sample due to time constraints.  Surveys were 
placed on the doorknobs of the selected houses with instructions to complete the survey and 
return it to the door on the scheduled pick up day (between 3 and 5 days after drop-off).  The 
instructions also provided a web address where the survey could be completed online and a 
mailing address where completed surveys could be sent after the collection date.  
Distribution occurred in two stages over a period of two weeks.  During the first stage, 
845 surveys were distributed to the first set of selected households.  This excludes the 22 
households that were eliminated from the initial sample because of signage near homes 
prohibiting trespassing or soliciting.  From this initial distribution, 48 completed surveys were 
collected while an additional 17 were completed online. Because of the analysis strategy for the 
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survey data, responses could only be included in the analysis if the block paired with the 
respondent’s block was also represented in the responses.  Therefore, of the remaining 26 blocks 
not reached in the first stage, only those with the potential to complete a pair of blocks, or whose 
pair had also not yet been sampled, received surveys in the second stage of distribution.  The 
resulting subsample included 132 households in 16 blocks. In total, 88 surveys were returned for 
a response rate of 9.01%.  While this rate is certainly not ideal, it is not unreasonable compared 
to similar studies especially given that no follow ups were issued (Londoño and Ando (2011) had 
a response rate of 14% with face to face follow up visits in the same geographic area).  57 
households left completed surveys for pickup, 21 responses were recorded online and 10 surveys 
were mailed in after the collection date.  Additional surveys continue to be submitted past the 
deadline and therefore are not included in the analysis.  From those 88 households, data for 34 
blocks in 17 completed pairs were available for analysis.  While there is always a concern of 
non-response bias due to the low response rate, Groves (2006) finds that despite the decrease in 
response rates across all household surveys, the link between low responses and bias is only 
indirectly a problem if the same variables drive both the response and the outcome of interest.  
There are limitations to this survey method and results should be interpreted cautiously 
because of the low response rate.  For many of the blocks, a single response is taken as 
representative of the block as a whole.  In actuality, there would be more variation within blocks, 
however it has also been shown that people tend to live near people that are similar to themselves 
(Bayer, McMillan, & Rueben, 2004), so using the data may be justified.  The differences in 
respondent and block averages presented in Table 4 are important to consider. The average age 
of the homes of respondents all of those in their blocks are comparable which is important in 
terms of how they might evaluate a retrofit project’s cost.  The respondents tended to be older 
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and wealthier than the average for their blocks, which could cause a problem if these variables 
are related to any of the social capital variables.   While there is a concern over a non-response 
bias, it seems unlikely that the bias introduced with this method would be significantly larger 
than it would have been with the convenience sampling method, and the block sampling strategy 
allows for more meaningful analysis.   
Block Sample Selection 
Propensity score matching (PSM), while not typically applied to cases like this, provides 
a matching technique that can be manipulated to allow the role of social capital to be analyzed, 
controlling for all other observed influences.  PSM typically involves a comparison in outcomes 
between a treatment and a control group, where participation in the treatment is known, in order 
to estimate the average treatment effect.  However, in this case, the variable whose effect on 
outcome is of interest (social capital index) is unknown at the time of matching.  In terms of 
PSM, this means the participation in treatment is unknown.  Therefore, instead of testing for the 
average treatment effect of social capital, dependent t-tests are used to test for significant 
differences in average social capital scores between paired neighborhoods.   
PSM is utilized to generate propensity scores that represent the likelihood of a block to 
have a positive outcome, which is defined as having at least one retrofitted household.  The 
likelihood score was estimated assuming the decision was modeled as follows: 
   (      )   (                                                       
                                                      ) 
Based on these scores, and a defined region common support (0.01), pairs were 
constructed so that they contained two blocks with similar likelihood of having at least one 
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participant but different actual outcomes.  The data collected through the survey then allows 
dependent t-tests to be used to see if social capital indices are significantly higher in blocks with 
retrofit participation than their paired counterparts.  A map of sampled blocks can be found in 
Figure 20. 
Statistical Methods 
It might be expected that in areas where neighbors interact more frequently and discuss 
household issues related to energy efficiency there would be more participation in the program.  
To test this hypothesis, a dependent, or paired, t-test is utilized.  The paired t-test uses the 
average difference in means across pairs to determine whether or not there is a significant 
difference in outcomes between the two groups.   In the general case, the null hypothesis 
is:    
∑        
 
   
 
= 0, where N is the number of pairs, xit is equal to the value for participating 
observation in pair 1, xic  is equal to the value for non-participating observation in pair 1. 
In this research, five variations of the paired t-test are used to determine if census blocks 
with at least one retrofit participant have significantly higher social capital scores than those that 
had none, given that all other observed characteristics are similar.  The variations include tests 
for differences in general neighborhood social capital scores, neighborhood social capital as 
related to the program, neighbor influence, and several interactions with neighbor and non-
neighbor influences with the null hypotheses being as follows: 
  
 1) Interaction of General Neighborhood Social Capital and Neighbor Influence 
  Ho:   
∑ (       ) (       )
 
   
 
   
 
 2) General Neighborhood Social Capital, no interaction 
  Ho:    
∑        
 
   
 
   
  
62 
 
 3) Interaction of Neighborhood Program Social Capital and Neighbor Influence 
  Ho:   
∑ (       ) (       )
 
   
 
   
 
 4) Neighborhood Program Social Capital, no interaction 
  Ho:   
∑        
 
   
 
   
 
 
 5) Non-Neighborhood Influence 
  Ho:   
∑        
 
   
 
    
  
Where   = pair number,  =total number of pairs, and the subscripts t and c identify 
the block as having at least one participant (t) or no participants (c).  
 
 
 The interacted outcomes are included because it might be that a household located in a 
neighborhood with high general social capital is not more likely to participate unless it also 
receives certain influences from its neighbors.  Neighbor influence alone is not expected to have 
an effect unless the neighbors share information and experience either generally (Test 1), or as 
related to the program (Test 3).  For each variation, the null hypothesis is that the average 
difference between pairs will be greater than or equal to 0, meaning the scores for participating 
blocks are expected to be higher than the scores for blocks with no participants.   
The results, shown in Table 13, suggest that for some measures of social capital and 
influence, scores for blocks with participation are significantly higher than those for blocks with 
no participation, and were positive even for those that were not significant.  The most significant 
result came from the comparison of the interaction of neighborhood social capital related to the 
program and the direction of influence from neighbors between the two groups.  The value for 
the treatment group was significantly higher than it was for the control group, suggesting that in 
blocks with program participants there was more sharing of information about the program and 
positive signals about the experience than in blocks with no participants.  While this result is not 
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necessarily surprising, it does give a reason to believe that neighborhood information sharing 
plays a role in decision making.  Because the difference in general neighborhood social capital 
measures on its own is not significant, it could be inferred that simply being part of a cohesive 
neighborhood will not increase participation, rather the perception that neighbors would approve 
of such a project, either by observing their behavior or assuming their attitudes based on other 
known information, is a necessary component.  Each of the categories of neighborhood social 
capital, when interacted with neighborhood influence, were significantly higher for the 
participating blocks, furthering the evidence that influence is a strong factor.  Interestingly, no 
significant difference between non-neighbor social influences could be determined between the 
two groups.  Since this variable is on a -1 to 1 scale, there is little variation in responses, and 
therefore it can be statistically more difficult to discern a difference between the groups. 
For future program designers, it seems likely that harnessing the potential of social 
capital can increase program effectiveness. For example, instead of spending more money 
advertising through traditional channels such as newspapers and radio ads, as the City of Urbana 
did, more resources could be put towards making participation in the program visible, and thus 
using a household’s participation as advertising.  If more households were aware of their 
neighbors’ participation, they may be more likely to participate.  Also, additional incentives 
could be offered to the first household to sign up from a distinct geographic area to maximize the 
extent of the impact.  A farther reaching influence will improve participation rates and assist the 
ultimate goal of reducing energy demand. 
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Part VI. Conclusion 
Participation in the Urbana-Ameren program was influenced by economic, information, 
and social factors, as well as background household characteristics.  To only explore one branch 
of these influences would be to not provide a complete explanation of the decision process.  This 
research expands on previous analyses of energy efficiency programs by examining the decision 
to participate from a variety of angles.  The inclusion of social pressure as a motivation of 
participation, as well as the technique used to examine its effect is especially unique to this 
research. 
The results of the analysis do not, in general, contradict the results of previous studies.  
The results of the Kernel density estimation motivate further exploration into the differences in 
effects of various household characteristics on audit and retrofit participation.  In particular, the 
results suggest that there were many households in blocks with newer homes that received the 
home energy audit.  While it is encouraging that these households sought out a way to reduce 
their demand for energy, it might not be the most efficient use of program funding to subsidize 
audits of newer homes that likely have adequate insulation.  The money may be more efficiently 
utilized as an incentive for landlords to upgrade rental properties, especially given the large 
proportion of rental units in Urbana.  
Tests of participant dispersion as clusters or as a diffusion process implied that 
participation in the audit phase likely did not grow outwards from the few early adopters, but 
rather grew in dense clusters near the town center.  This result motivates the further analysis of 
information sharing and social pressures, as households closer together are likely to transfer 
these influences to one another. 
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Unsurprisingly, the population of eligible households, defined as owner occupied units, 
was a significant predictor of audit participation in the zero-inflated Poisson model.  However, 
the average age of the homes was only significant as a dummy variable, not as a continuous 
variable, suggesting “older” homes were more likely to participate than “newer” homes, but that 
year to year differences in home construction were not a factor.  Also, blocks with higher 
percentage of college graduates and higher median household incomes had higher participation 
rates.  This could be due to the relation between education and income and willingness to pay for 
environmental conservation (Klineberg et al., (1998).  Future programs might strive to present 
the benefits of participation in such a way that appeals to lower income individuals, for example, 
stressing the potential financial savings instead of the environmental benefits; and also provide 
more financing options to low income households. 
Retrofit project participation was estimated to be higher in blocks with higher average 
estimated subsidies available and, somewhat surprisingly, lower when estimated gas savings 
were higher according to the ordered Probit model.  Without exact information on audit results 
for households that did not receive a subsidy for a retrofit it is difficult to say with certainty the 
reason for this surprising result.  However because the gas savings per unit of insulation installed 
was highest for wall insulation and wall insulation was the least popular improvement measure, 
it is likely there is an unobserved preference away from wall insulation. The positive and 
significant effect of the number of audits in the block supports the case for the importance of 
information provision.  Even though not all audited households moved forward with retrofit 
projects, it is clear that a household was much more likely to retrofit after having an audit.  
Encouraging households likely to save through insulation upgrades (for example older homes) 
will reduce the hurdle of uncertainty inherent in retrofit projects, and increase demand reduction 
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projects.  If exact data on audit results were available for all audited households, this analysis 
could be enhanced and the additional measurement error introduced by the imputed values could 
be avoided. 
Finally, the comparison of neighborhood social capital scores suggests that interactions, 
and specifically sharing of attitudes towards specific behaviors, is more common in blocks with 
retrofit participants.  It is possible that there is an opportunity for future programs to capitalize on 
this through increased public acknowledgement of early participants and encouraging early 
participation in geographically diverse neighborhoods.  This conclusion could be better 
supported if the survey response rate was larger, however the strength of these results should not 
be overly discounted.  
One necessary extension in future work would be to account for the spatial 
autocorrelation in participation decisions. A measure of spatial dependence is not included in 
these participation prediction models because it can be difficult to include spatial variables in the 
non-linear models utilized.  While the results would be enhanced if this important factor was 
included, the current results should not be completely discounted.  Many of the explanatory 
variables (such as housing structure age and number of owner occupied units) are also spatially 
autocorrelated in a similar pattern as participation, as seen in their density maps (Figures 3-7).  
The inclusion of these variables will assume some of the impact of spatial autocorrelation, but a 
further exploration of this effect is recommended for future research.  Extensions of this work 
should also look into alternative specifications of the audit report variable prediction model.  The 
Heckman sample selection model estimates could be improved upon as they did not match 
closely with the known outcomes.  Perhaps eliminating some of the outlier observations in the 
estimation would improve the overall fit.  Further, the inverse mills ratio suggests there is no 
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need to correct for sample selection, allowing for a broader range of estimation techniques to be 
utilized. 
With increased legislation requiring reduction in energy demands it is important that 
programs such as the Urbana-Ameren Act on Energy program reach the households that stand to 
benefit the most from upgrading their insulation, in terms of energy reduction and savings.   The 
environmental and health damages of fuel use can be mitigated by programs that incentivize 
behavior and correct the market failure of the negative externalities.  The Urbana-Ameren 
program was successful in using economic incentives to encourage households to schedule a 
home energy audit, while the effectiveness of the economic incentives for retrofitting is less clear 
in this analysis. Future programs might attempt to address the different dimensions of the 
efficiency gap using a more diverse set of incentives.  For example, compensating early adopting 
households in each neighborhood would correct the market failure of information as a public 
good discussed by Jaffe and Stavins (1994).  Also, adding additional financing options could 
assist lower income households that do not have the capital for the initial project investment.  
Finally, the relationship between social capital and participation suggests offering incentives for 
participants to share their experiences with neighbors and friends could lead to higher 
participation rates.  The integration of  results from spatial, econometric and social analyses in 
this work provide a more robust explanation of participation patterns and can assist future 
program organizers in their goal of energy demand reduction. 
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Appendix A 
Survey Cover Letter 
Urbana and Ameren Household Energy Efficiency Program 
My name is Jackie Willwerth and I am a graduate student at the University of Illinois in the 
department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics.  I am conducting a survey to analyze the 
role of neighborhood connectedness on participation in the Urbana and Ameren household 
energy efficiency program.  The results of this survey will be analyzed to provide feedback to 
program organizers and to inform the design of future energy efficiency programs.   
Participation in the survey is voluntary and will take approximately ten minutes.  You will not be 
asked to give any identifying information such as your name or exact address.  Your 
participation and answers to this survey will be held completely confidential.  You should only 
complete this survey if you are over 18 years old.   
Please consider the questions to the survey and answer them to the best of your ability.  You 
can decide to stop at any time.  If you choose to fill out the survey right now, please return the 
finished survey in the box provided.  If you would rather answer this survey online, a link to a 
digital version is available online at http://db.tt/1ItKaBSX.  You can also choose to mail the 
completed survey to: 
Professor Amy Ando 
326 Mumford Hall 
1301 W. Gregory Dr. 
Urbana, IL 61801 
If you have any questions about this survey or this research please contact me at 
willwer2@illinois.edu, or my advisor Professor Amy Ando, amyando@illinois.edu, 333-5130.  
Thank you in advance for your participation. 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study or any concerns or 
complaints, please contact the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board at 217-333-2670 
(collect calls will be accepted if you identify yourself as a research participant) or via email at 
irb@illinois.edu. 
Background: 
The Urbana and Ameren Household Energy Efficiency Program was designed to 
encourage residents of Urbana to decrease their use of home heating fuels by making their 
homes more energy efficient.  Home owners in Urbana were eligible to receive a free home 
energy audit and rebates for various efficiency improvements including adding insulation to 
walls and attics.  
  
74 
 
 
Survey 
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Survey (continued) 
 
16. Please draw a circle to show roughly where you live. 
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Appendix B 
Extended Survey Results Discussion 
 The survey administered as part of this research provided useful insight into the decisions 
made by many households regarding the Urbana-Ameren home energy efficiency program.  In 
addition to the data collected for use in the main analyses, the survey responses provided 
anecdotal information about residents’ experiences with the program, and additional information 
that can be further explored at the household level to explain participation patterns.  Looking at 
the responses at the household level allows for more observations to be included because the 
responses from blocks with no responses from their block pair are kept, as well as the responses 
collected during the initial convenience sampling stage.  In total, 136 responses were collected 
and will be used in this extended discussion.  
Through the distribution process, observations of the neighborhoods supported the social 
capital analysis because of the perceived differences in neighborhood cohesion and acceptance of 
outsiders to their homes.  For example, some of the sampled neighborhoods had many 
households with no trespassing signs, while others all had welcome mats.  With regards to 
accepting the survey, some residents were not welcoming to receive the survey while others were 
much more supportive of the work
10
.  Neighborhoods with households that appear less 
welcoming to strangers could be the areas less likely to interact with their neighbors or to host an 
auditor in their homes.   
 One important benefit of the survey was that it was collected at the household level, a 
finer scale than the other data sources for this analysis.  While it is important to remember that 
the survey respondents on average had higher incomes and were more highly educated than the 
                                                     
10
 Special thanks to the respondent who left Hershey Kisses with the completed survey. 
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general population (see Table 4 for a full comparison of drop-off/pick-up respondents versus city 
averages), the responses can still be analyzed for general trends in participation not testable at the 
block level.  Of the 133 completed surveys collected from both collection methods, 33 
households had an audit through the program and 12 received a subsidy payment for insulation 
upgrades.  Of those who audited, 6 knew of a neighbor who had also audited while 2 of the 
retrofitted households knew of a neighbor retrofitting. 
 The survey concluded with a question asking for the reasoning behind the respondents’ 
participation decision.  These open ended responses could be generally categorized into a few 
distinct lines of reasoning presented in Figure A1.  The most common reason provided was that 
the respondent was unaware of the program.  Program organizer used various methods of 
advertising including newspapers and radio ads as well as providing information with gas bills, 
however there still seems to be a large amount of residents who are not aware of the program.  
This seems particularly troubling because it might be expected that people who were aware of 
the program were more likely to respond to the survey, suggesting an even higher proportion of 
the city in general was unaware of the program.  When asked from where they received 
information on the program, most respondents listed the City of Urbana or Ameren Illinois 
which shows that the organizers did reach many residents with their marketing materials.  Figure 
A2 shows the frequency of responses listing various information sources.  Very few households 
(4 respondents) stated that they received information from their neighbors on the program 
however 15 were aware of their neighbors participation decision to audit and 25 were aware of 
the their decision to retrofit.  While information may not have been formally exchanged, 
households would still know something about their neighbors’ attitude if they knew their 
participation.   
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Interestingly, the second most common reason provided for not participating was that 
homeowners felt their homes were already efficient.  It is important to remember that more 
participation is only better when participation is cost efficient.  Higher subsidies or more 
aggressive information campaigns to induce these households to participate would not be optimal 
policy.  Additionally, 3 respondents stated they were upgrading their insulation on their own and 
another 5 respondents discussed previous investments in other improvements including installing 
efficient windows and appliances.  Upgrading insulation through the program may be a substitute 
for other efficiency projects which are also achieving the same goal of reducing fuel demand. 
Another interesting trend is the number of respondents who stated they wanted to 
participate but never actually took action to schedule an audit (8 respondents).  This trend 
supports the efficiency gap literature finding that inertia is a significant barrier to participation.  
It is unclear from the data available if a larger financial incentive would have motivated these 
households to take action or if they would have responded better to more information or 
increased social pressure.   
Finally, 43 participants said they did not participate but would be interested in 
participating in a similar program in the future, 14 of which are renters.  There seems to be an 
interest in a second phase of the program, however as more households become efficient it might 
be more costly to incentivize further improvements.  Therefore, rental properties that have not 
been previously addressed would make a practical next target market.  Generally, the survey 
results suggest that there are many impediments to participation beyond the financial cost.  
While some can be addressed in future program designs, such as spreading more awareness of 
the available benefits or developing a similar program for rental properties, others such as the 
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inconvenience of scheduling home maintenance and mistrust of strangers in the home may be 
more difficult problems to overcome with policy.     
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Summary of Insulation Upgrades Installed 
 
Insulation Projects  
Number of 
Households 
Percent of 
Retrofitters 
Average amount 
installed 
Attic Insulation 140 92% 1211.833 sq. ft. 
Wall Insulation 116 76% 642.81 sq. ft. 
Air Sealing 148 97% 1047.851 cfm 
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Table 2: Estimated Retrofit Outcomes Summary Statistics 
a 
These outcomes were provided to the households during the audit stage of the program 
b
 The home with electric heat had zero estimated gas savings 
c
 Includes the Ameren rebates and the additional 20% provided by the City 
  
Estimated Retrofit 
Outcomes
a Average 
Standard 
 Deviation 
Min Max 
Project Cost after Subsidy  $4,116.33   $9,698.26   $545.20   $116,966.60  
Gas Savings (Therms) 9,938.04 12,191.98 0
b
 95,249.75 
Total Incentives Received
c
  $1,693.12   $1,034.92   $169.92   $5,065.92  
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Table 3: Social Capital Variable Definitions 
Social 
Capital 
Variable 
Purpose Related Survey Question(s) Variable Coding  
(G) 
General 
Neighborho
od Social 
Capital 
Index 
Strength of 
ties between 
neighbors 
Which of the following has someone in 
your household done in the past two 
years? 
1. Borrow or lend ingredients with a 
neighbor 
2. Have a neighbor take care of plants 
or pets or take in your mail 
3. Attend a neighborhood association 
meeting 
4. Attend a neighborhood block party 
 
ci = 1 if question is selected 
(R) 
Program-
related 
Neighborho
od Social 
Capital 
Index 
Level of 
program 
information 
and 
experience 
shared 
Did any of your neighbors get a free 
home energy audit? (Yes, No, Don’t 
know)* 
 
Did any of your neighbors do an 
insulation upgrade? (Yes, No, Don’t 
know)*  
 
*A response of  “Yes” or “No” 
increased score equally  because it 
signifies they are aware of their 
neighbors participation 
 
Selected Neighbor as an information 
source 
 
 
ka = 1 if knows neighbor did or did 
not audit 
ka = 0 I does  not know if neighbor 
audited 
kr = 1 if knows neighbor did or did 
not retrofit 
kr = 0 if does not know if neighbor 
retrofitted 
in =1 if got information on 
program from a neighbor 
in =0 if did not get information on 
program from a neighbor 
(I) 
Neighborho
od Social 
Influence 
Social 
influences 
faced within 
neighborhoo
d 
Did any of your neighbors get a free 
home energy audit? (Yes, No, Don’t 
know) 
 
Did any of your neighbors do an 
insulation upgrade? (Yes, No, Don’t 
know)  
 
Do you think your neighbors would 
react positively to updating their 
insulation to have a more energy 
efficient home? (Yes, No, Don’t know) 
 
 
an = 1 if neighbor had an audit 
an = 0 if neighbor did not have an 
audit or unknown 
rn = 1 if neighbor had a retrofit 
rn = 0 if neighbor did not retrofit or 
is unknown 
N = -1 if “No” 
N = 0 if “Don’t know” 
N = 1 if “Yes” 
(F)  
Non-
neighborho
od Social 
Influence 
Social 
influences 
faced 
outside the 
neighborhoo
d 
Do you think your friends and family 
who are not also your neighbors would 
react positively to updating their 
insulation to have a more energy 
efficient home? (Yes, No, Don't 
Know) 
F = -1 if “No” 
F = 0 if “Don’t Know” 
F = 1 if “Yes” 
 
  ∑  
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Table 4: Comparison of Survey Sample and City Population Characteristics 
Demographic 
Variable 
Sample Average City Average 
Average difference 
between block sample 
and population
a
 
Year of home 
construction 
 
1958 1959 3.4 
Percent of population 
over 65 years old 
 
54 24.8 48% 
Median household 
income 
 
$68,773 $32,808  25873.46 
Percent of population 
with graduate degree 
58% 33.5%  -1% 
a
 These figure represent the average difference between each sampled block’s population and survey 
response values 
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Table 5: Urbana versus the United States Census Demographics 
Demographic Variable Urbana Average US Average 
Median age 
 
24.8 37.2 
Percent of households 
that are renter occupied 
 
65% 34.9% 
Median household 
income 
 
$32,808  $41,851  
Educational Attainment 93% with high school degree 85.4% with high school degree 
  33.5% with graduate degree 8.9% with graduate degree 
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Table 6: Number of Audit Participants per Block Estimation Results from a Zero-Inflated 
Poisson Model
a
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
average year of home construction 
 
0.000 
(0.002) 
 
- 
average year of home construction before 1975 - 0.280*** 
(0.109) 
 
# owner occupied housing units 
 
0.020*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
 
average home square footage 
 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
 
% of population with college degree 
 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.024) 
 
median household income 
 
0.0525** 
(0.025) 
0.053** 
(0.025) 
 
% of population over 65 years old 
 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
 
constant -0.191 
(3.413) 
-0.225 
(0.184) 
Zero Inflation
b
 
  # owner occupied housing units 
 
-0.229** 
(0.044) 
-0.236*** 
(0.044) 
constant 
0.890 
(0.255) 
0.922*** 
(0.252) 
Note: each of the variables were constructed at the Census Block level 
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; and *** 1% significance 
a
 This model is overall significant (Prob>χ2= <0.001) 
b
 Of 494 total, 304 non-zero observations and 190 zero observations 
 
  
  
86 
 
Table 7: Likelihood of an Audited Household to Retrofit, Heckman Sample 
Selection Model First Stage 
 
Note: This estimation was performed at the household level and Census block average 
values for explanatory variable were used because rounded addresses could not be 
matched to specific household level data. 
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; and *** 1% significance 
  
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
average year of home construction  
 
 
-0.006** 0.0029 
average home square footage 
 
 
0.022 0.021 
average housing value -0.0513 .051 
% of population over 65 years old 
 
0.006 0.0041 
# owner occupied housing units 
 
-0.001 0.0035 
% of population with college degree 
 
0.001 0.0041 
median household income 
 
0.037 0.036 
constant 10.916** 5.562851 
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Table 8: Coefficient Estimates of Housing Characteristics on Various Predicted Retrofit 
Outcomes 
Variable Total Subsidy 
Received 
Project Cost 
pre-subsidy 
Gas Savings
a
 Project Cost 
After Subsidy 
average year of home 
construction 
 
-13.271*** 
(5.010) 
-40.577*** 
(12.294) 
-175.412** 
(72.233) 
-27.305*** 
(10.474) 
average home square footage 
 
 
0.281 
(22.684) 
80.699 
(55.420) 
158.88 
(322.824) 
80.418* 
(46.859) 
constant  28043.260*** 
(8685.362) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
50895.06*** 
(18142.25) 
 
mills lambda -321.446 1440.096 12570.52 1761.542 
Wald Chi 2 10.57 11.22 7.16 6.86 
Prob>chi 2 0.0051 0.00 0.0279 0.0324 
Note: These estimates are the results of the second stage of a Heckman Sample Selection Model for 
retrofit participation.  The estimation was performed at the household level and Census block average 
values for explanatory variable were used because rounded addresses could not be matched to specific 
household level data. 
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; and *** 1% significance 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a
 Gas savings are defined as the therms saved over the expected lifetime of the project 
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Table 9: Correlation Matrix of Retrofit Participation Estimation Explanatory Variables 
 
average 
estimated gas 
savings
a
 
average 
estimated cost 
post subsidy
a
 
average 
estimated 
subsidy 
received
a
 
# of audits per 
block 
% of 
population 
over 65 years 
old 
 
average estimated 
gas savings
a
 
1     
average estimated 
cost post subsidy
a 0.8641 1    
average estimated 
subsidy received
a
 
0.9110 0.8052 1   
# of audits per 
block 
-0.1466 -0.1090 -0.0906 1  
% of population 
over 65 years old 
 
-0.4375 -0.2879 -0.1380 0.1975 
 
1 
a
 The three average estimated variables are the predicted values imputed from the Heckman Sample 
Selection Model  
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Table 10: Ordered Probit Model for Retrofit Participation  
with Select Demographic Variables 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
average estimated gas savings
a 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
 
-0.035 0.017 
average estimated cost post subsidy
a 
0.013 
(0.033) 
 
-0.052 0.078 
average estimated subsidy received
a 
0.089 
(0.082) 
 
-0.072 0.249 
# of audits per block 0.268*** 
(0.046) 
 
0.177 0.358 
% of population over 65 years old 
 
0.001 
(0.010) 
 
-0.019 0.021 
median household income 0.023 
(0.067) 
 
-0.109 0.155 
% of population with college degree 
 
0.003 
(0.005) 
 
-0.008 0.013 
# owner occupied housing units 
 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.022 0.009 
   N = 304 
 
 Pseudo R
2 
= 0.1305 
   Prob>χ
2 
= <0.001 
Note: This regression includes demographic variables later omitted due to multicollinearity 
which explains the low levels of significance.  The categories for the ordered probit included 0 
retrofits, 1 retrofit and greater than 1 retrofit per Census block. 
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; and *** 1% significance 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a
 The three average estimated variables are the predicted values imputed from the Heckman 
Sample Selection Model  
  
90 
 
Table 11: Ordered Probit Model for Retrofit Participation 
Excluding Demographic Variables 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
average estimated gas savings
a
 -0.016* 
(0.009) 
 
-0.033 0.001 
average estimated cost post subsidy
a
 0.029 
(0.025) 
 
-0.020 0.078 
average estimated subsidy received
a
 0.135** 
(0.058) 
 
0.021 0.249 
# of audits per block 0.260*** 
(0.042) 
 
0.178 0.342 
% of population over 65 years old 
 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.020 0.013 
    N= 304 
  
Pseudo R2= 0.1286 
    Prob>χ2= <0.001 
Note: This regression excludes demographic variables omitted due to multicollinearity.  
The categories for the ordered probit included 0 retrofits, 1 retrofit and greater than 1 retrofit 
per Census block. 
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; and *** 1% significance 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a
 The three average estimated variables are the predicted values imputed from the Heckman 
Sample Selection Model  
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Table 12: Ordered Probit Estimated Marginal Effects on Retrofit Participation 
 
Note: Marginal effects on the central region cannot be estimated (Greene, 2008) 
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; and *** 1% significance 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a
 The three average estimated variables are the predicted values imputed from the Heckman Sample 
Selection Model   
 
Estimated Marginal Effect 
Variable 
Y=Prob(shell 
participation=0) 
Y=Prob(shell 
participation > 1) 
average estimated gas savings a 0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
average estimated cost post subsidy a -0.010 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
average estimated subsidy received a -0.047** 
(0.020) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
# of audits per block -0.091*** 
(0.015) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
% of population over 65 years old 0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
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Table 13: Paired t-test Results for Social Capital Variables between Participating and Non-
participating Blocks 
Test
a
 
Mean 
Difference
b
 
1. neighborhood social capital*neighborhood influence 0.8241* 
2. neighborhood social capital 0.3922 
3. neighborhoods program social capital *neighborhood influence 0.8259** 
4. neighborhood program social capital 0.3039* 
5. non-neighbor social influence 0.0889 
Note: * 10% significance; ** 5% significance; and *** 1% significance 
a
 For a description of the variables, see Table 3 
b
 Calculated as average score for the participating block - average score for the non-participating 
block 
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Figure 1: Urbana Audit Participant Locations 
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Figure 2: Urbana Retrofit Participant Locations 
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Figure 3: Urbana Audit Participation Kernel Density Estimation 
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Figure 4: Urbana Retrofit Participation Kernel Density Estimation  
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Figure 5: Background Population #1 
Urbana Households with Less than Three Units 
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Figure 6: Background Population #2 
Urbana Households Built Prior to 1975 
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Figure 7: Background Population #3 
Number of Owner Occupied Households per Census Block 
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Figure 8: Issue of Density Estimation Spillovers 
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Figure 9: Block Ratio-Audit Kernel Density Estimation versus Households 
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Figure 10: Block Ratio- Audit Kernel Density Estimation  
versus Households Built Prior to 1975  
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Figure 11: Block Ratio-Audit Kernel Density Estimation 
versus Number of Owner Occupied Households 
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Figure 12: Block Ratio- Retrofit Kernel Density Estimation versus all Households 
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Figure 13: Block Ratio- Retrofit Kernel Density Estimation versus  
Households Built Prior to 1975 
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Figure 14: Block Ratio- Retrofit Kernel Density Estimation versus 
 the Number of Owner Occupied Households 
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Figure 15: Block Ratio- Retrofit Kernel Density versus Audit Kernel Density Estimation 
 
 
  
108 
 
Figure 16: Participation in the Urbana Audit Program over Time 
(a) First Two Months 
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Figure 16: Participation in the Urbana Audit Program over Time 
(b) First six months 
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Figure 16: Participation in the Urbana Audit Program over Time 
(c) First twelve months 
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Figure 16: Participation in the Urbana Audit Program Over Time 
(d) Complete Participation 
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Figure 17: Audit Participants per Census Block Distribution 
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Figure 18: Actual versus Predicted Audit Report Variables 
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Figure 19: Retrofit Participant Census Block Distribution  
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Figure 20: Urbana Census Blocks Sampled for Survey Distribution
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Figure A1: Categorized Survey Comment Responses 
 
Note: Not all respondents wrote additional comments.  Some responses were counted for multiple 
categories.   
 
  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Installed insulation on own
Not interested
Mistrust of system
Financial Issue
Did other efficiency upgrades
Meant to participate but never did
Other
Knew home was efficient already
Unaware of the program
Responses 
"If there are other reasons you did or did not participate in this 
program, please list them here:" 
  
117 
 
Figure A2: Program Information Sources and their Influence on the Household 
Participation Decision 
 
*Respondents were allowed to select more than one information source. 
Those who selected “Other” wrote in sources including this survey (5), contractors, church 
groups and newspapers. 
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"Please choose which of the following sources you got 
information from about this program.  Also, please 
mark if the information affected your decision to 
participate." 
Got Information
Affected Decision
